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ABSTRACT 
 Following the increase of transnational threats in the Sahel and even further in the 
Maghreb, the regional security cooperation’s ability to tackle these threats and their root 
causes is predicated on certain conditions. These basic conditions include regional 
countries’ shared perception of the threats, development of a comprehensive geographic 
Sahel–Maghreb approach with the support of external partners and the international 
community, and proper balance between security, development, and governance. The 
transnational nature of threats and their interconnections characterize these 
unprecedented security challenges. Lessons learned from successful and failed attempts 
at regional security cooperation as well as the U.S.-led initiatives and an analysis of the 
United States, European Union, and African Union strategy for the Sahel reveal 
significant findings, ranging from the global awareness of the deteriorating security 
environment and the need for collective action, to the need to overcome regional rivalries 
and adopt a less military-centric approach. The overall end state remains the framing of a 
suitable and workable regional cooperation beyond security that contributes to regional 
and global security and stability and prosperity in both the Sahel and the Maghreb. 
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The progressive deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel since the mid-
1990s has made the region one of the most dangerous in Africa. The volume and intensity 
of transnational criminal activities such as terrorism; drugs, weapons, and human 
trafficking; and insurgencies have created a dangerous and unpredictable security 
environment. The vast, ungoverned desert regions in Northern and Eastern Mauritania, 
Northern Mali, Northern and Eastern Niger, Northern Chad, and Southern Libya have 
become a sanctuary for these criminal groups, which constitute a real and growing threat 
for the weak Sahel states. Mali already paid the price in 2012, when a coalition of terrorist 
groups, drug smugglers, and rebel groups seized and held three administrative regions in 
Mali’s north for ten months, proclaiming the area as the Republic of Azawad.1 The 2012 
crisis marked the culmination of recurring rebellions since 1960. It was the first time, 
however, that an armed coalition—led by the National Movement for the Liberation of 
Azawad (NMLA) and backed by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement 
for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), and drug smugglers—succeeded in forcing 
the retreat of the Malian defense and security forces toward the southern regions.  
It is clear that the terrorist- and criminal-affected Sahel states—Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia—cannot individually address the prevailing 
security threats, which are regional in nature. This thesis examines how countries in the 
region have combined their efforts—and how they might further cooperate—in order to 
tackle collectively these transnational threats by shaping and enforcing a new security 
environment for the region’s overall security and stability. 
 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Historically, states have cooperated regionally to address and overcome security 
challenges. In 1947, Britain advocated for an arrangement for regional military cooperation 
                                                 
1 Azawad—a region in the northern part of the Republic of Mali claimed, without any historical basis, 
by some Tuareg tribes aiming for the creation of an independent state under the name of Azawad.  
   
 
2 
in Western Europe,2 which paved the way for the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) to face the Soviet threat. While facing the post–Cold War global 
crises, including civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in Africa, East Timor in Asia, the 
former Yugoslavia, Tajikistan, and Georgia in Europe, many states have attempted various 
experiments to regionalize peace and security.3 In 2009, countries in the Gulf of Aden and 
Arabian Sea, western Indian Ocean, and Red Sea including Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, France, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, 
Tanzania, and Yemen responded collectively to a growing regional piracy problem.4 
Through regional centers, these countries exchange information, plan and conduct joint 
patrols, and build navies’ capacity for coastal states.5 They have also adopted consensual 
standard procedures in repressing and suppressing piracy in the western Indian Ocean as 
well as the Gulf of Aden through regional cooperation.6 These regional anti-piracy centers 
operate similarly to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).7 Therefore, states, perceiving benefits in cooperating 
regionally in the security domain, promoted and have been using regional security 
cooperation in addressing their regional security concerns. 
Recently, the East African States regional security cooperation through the African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) focused on Al Shaabab in Somalia and the newly 
born G5 Sahel—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger—targeting terrorism in 
the region are a few examples of regional security cooperation set up to deal with threats 
in Africa. Advocates for regional security cooperation assume that regional security 
                                                 
2 Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” Journal 
of Peace Research 23, no. 3 (September 1986): 269, https://doi.org/10.1177/002234338602300305.  
3 Louise Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism,” 
International Affairs 80, no 3 (May 2004): 434, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00391.x. 
4 Freedom Onuoha, “Sea Piracy and Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa: The Somali Coast and 
Gulf of Aden in Perspective,” African Security Review 18, no 3 (September 2009): 41–42, DOI: 
10.1080/10246029.2009.9627540. 
5 Onuoha, “Sea Piracy and Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa.” 
6 Onuoha. 
7 Onuoha.  
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cooperation promotes states’ collective effort, or likely influences them to overcome 
traditional obstacles and sources of rivalry that push states to adopt counterproductive and 
detrimental policies to regional and collective security.  
This thesis seeks to define the characteristics of regional security cooperation that 
determine success or failure. Based on these characteristics, the research provides 
perspectives on regional security cooperation that offer potential options to states in order 
to better achieve their objective in a collective effort. The thesis further provides policy 
makers, from the Sahel states in particular, and the United Nations (UN), the African Union 
(AU), the European Union (EU), the Economic West African States (ECOWAS), and the 
Maghreb in general, insights about indispensable factors necessary for successful regional 
security cooperation in the Sahel. As the region faces growing transnational security 
challenges that threaten regional and global security and stability, regional security 
cooperation is potentially an effective response. As part of the debate, the study also 
provides the typology of regional security cooperation related to its effectiveness.  
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Regional security cooperation has long been an evolving concept, but it has gained 
more urgency with today’s rising security concerns. The complexity and the diversity of 
current regional and global security challenges that transcend national borders better 
explain this constant evolution of the regional security concept praised by states as the way 
to build a secure and stable collective environment. In 2016, at the first plenary session of 
the seventh Xiangshan forum in China on “enhance[ing] security dialogue and cooperation 
and establish[ing] a new type of international relations,” the Vice Foreign Minister of 
China, Liu Zhenmin, shared his thoughts; specifically, he commended the topic of 
“working together to improve regional security architecture and address common 
challenges,” as highly relevant for regional countries and a reflection of a “common need 
to deal with security challenges together.”8 This perspective echoes Muthiah Alagappa’s 
                                                 
8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Work Together to Improve Regional 
Security Architecture and Address Common Challenges,” accessed September 3, 2018, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1405158.shtml. 
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point about regionalism being cooperation among regional states to enhance their national 
well-being for mutual gain.9 To explore this theme more fully, this section analyzes trends 
in the concept of regional security cooperation through different scholars’ perspectives. As 
such, this literature review has four sections: trends in the literature, tentative definitions 
of regional security cooperation concepts, regional security cooperation and regionalism, 
securitization theory and regional security cooperation, and theoretical paradigms and 
regional security cooperation.  
1. Trends in the Literature  
Throughout the literature, three main trends emerge. The first group touts the plus 
side of regional cooperation. The second group identifies some of the balancing necessary 
to make regional cooperation work. Lastly, some thought leaders remain critical of regional 
cooperation and emphasize the negative side.  
Regional security cooperation is beneficial for states because it helps reduce the 
prospect of wars and security challenges as well as promotes collective security efforts. 
Barry Buzan and Ole Waerver indicate that the invention of the concept of the regional 
security complex aimed to support regional-level initiatives as the appropriate way for 
performing large practical security analysis.10 In other words, the regional security 
dynamic remains “the interplay between global powers and close security 
interdependence.”11 Seth G. Jones, citing Alexander Wendt, argues for the benefits of 
regional security cooperation and notes the example of European states that “have 
internalized common norms and values to such a degree that the security of others is not 
only viewed as related to their own, but ‘as literally being their own.’”12 As a result, the 
current concept of security is viewed as a regional matter.13 Fred Chernoff notes that 
                                                 
9 Muthiah Alagappa, “Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework for Analysis,” Review of 
International Studies 21, no. 4 (1995): 363. http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/20097422. 
10 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 43, https://scholar.google.com/. 
11 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, 43. 
12 Seth G. Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 53, https://scholar.google.com/. 
13 Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, 53.  
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promoting cooperation through regimes minimizes its dangers and costs.14 Referring to 
Robert Keohane, Chernoff also argues the probability of cooperation as a continuous 
established regime whenever countries share a community of interests.15 In the same way, 
Clive Archer qualifies the advantages of regional cooperation as “a collective defense” 
with the objectives “to defend members against an identified enemy or threat,” including 
planning “between the members on how such threats might be met by a collective 
response.”16 Therefore, regional security cooperation contributes to undermine interstate 
wars and drive states toward a collective effort in addressing security challenges. 
Alyson Bailes and Andrew Cottey argue that regional security cooperation offers 
fundamental conditions for interaction, communication, and dialogue among members 
handled at high-level meetings that include heads of state and other senior civil and military 
officials.17 Such an environment definitely helps foster mutual confidence, prevent 
miscommunication and misperception, and build consensus around shared interests and 
identity.18 Bailes and Cottey further justify the benefits as a system aiming to ensure a 
collective response to aggression and threats to peace with the prevention or containment 
of wars.19 They also estimate that cooperation shapes states behavior positively and 
minimizes their tendency to the use of force and ensures their abiding by existing 
international rules related to the respect of borders, use of certain types of weapons, and 
conduct of provocative actions such as military movements.20 Lastly, referring to security 
community, Bailes and Cottey argue that Karl Deutsch views the reassurance benefits of 
cooperation as an environment free of members’ interstate wars where disputes are settled 
                                                 
14 Holger Mölder, “The Security Dilemma in the Baltic Sea Region and Its Impact on the Regional 
Security and Defense Cooperation” (PhD diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 1998), 13, 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/26755/securitydilemmai00mold.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowe
d=y. 
15  Mölder, 13.  
16 Mölder, 14.  
17 Alyson J. K. Bailes and Andrew Cottey, “4. Regional Security Cooperation in the Early 21st 
Century,” SIPRI (1992), 200, 202, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB06ch04.pdf.  
18 Bailes and Cottey, 202. 
19 Bailes and Cottey, 202. 
20 Bailes and Cottey. 
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peacefully in some other way.21 In theory, these scholarly views carry perspectives that 
advocate the relevancy and the efficacy of regional security cooperation to overcome 
security issues in a collective way.  
Nevertheless, these perspectives tend to minimize challenges that obstruct the 
implementation of such an ideal (if not idealized) regional harmony. For example, Olli J. 
Teirilä points out that the “nexus of terrorism and organized crime [have] posed wide 
ranging challenges to international cooperation,” while comparing the security situation in 
the Andean and the Sahel regions.22 Teirilä also argues that analysis of relations “between 
insurgency, terrorism, and organized crime” in these two regions shares various 
similarities, including security threats and possible strategic weaknesses in the groups 
involved.23 The overlapping of multiple security actors worsens security and states’ 
cooperation, raising the question of ownership of the issues.24 G. Shabbir Cheema 
emphasizes that the success of a cooperation resides in the connection between the 
organizations’ composition and the problem these organizations confront,25 meaning that 
a lack of balance challenges the effectiveness of regional security cooperation.   
Additionally, effective regional security cooperation requires states to perceive 
threats similarly. Raino Vayrynen argues that a workable regional security cooperation 
primarily requires a shared perception of challenges coupled with the willingness of states 
to take collective action.26 Achieving such effective cooperation goes along with the 
general desire to promote peaceful intra-regional relations and to ensure a sustainable 
                                                 
21 Bailes and Cottey, 201. 
22 Olli J. Teirilä, “The Challenges to Cooperation Posed by the Nexus of Terrorism and Organized 
Crime: Comparing the Situations between the Andean and the Sahel Regions,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 37, no. 1 (2014), 18, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.853605.  
23 Teirilä, 36. 
24 Teirilä.  
25 G. Shabbir Cheema, Christopher A. McNally, and Vesselin Popovski, eds. Cross-border 
Governance in Asia: Regional Issues and Mechanisms (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2011), 
108, doi:10.1107/s0108768107031758/bs5044sup1.cif.  
26 Raino Vayrynen, “Collective Violence in a Discontinuous World: Regional Realities and Global 
Fallacies,’” International Social Science Journal 38, no. 4 (1986): 522, 
doi:10.1107/s0108768107031758/bs5044sup1.cif. 
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regional autonomy.27 For a regional cooperation to work, according to Buzan and Waever, 
states must realize that their national securities are almost inseparable, because their 
concerns on security issues are fundamentally and collectively interconnected.28 Michael 
Barnett mitigates his argument arguing, for example, the high dependency of the prospect 
of regional security cooperation in the Middle East “on whether the region establishes the 
conditions for strategic stability and mutual assurance,” before acknowledging that “the 
present predilection for competitive security arrangements and the continuing drama of 
domestic conflict undermines the promise of regional security cooperation.”29 In sum, 
various challenges make the effectiveness of regional security cooperation less obvious in 
achieving their intended outcomes. 
Some thought leaders remain more pessimistic about the effectiveness of regional 
security cooperation. Louise Fawcett, for instance, identifies capacity, sovereignty, and 
hegemony as three issues contributing to her pessimism on contemporary regionalism.30 
She argues that states’ limited capacity and resources in less industrialized countries 
constrain their action, “whether in the military, economic, diplomatic, or institutional 
sphere.”31 Charter constraints attach “a high priority to sovereignty and non-interference” 
principles and increase such limitations.32 She then emphasizes that the persistence of 
suspicion, rivalry, and competition further reduces the prospects for cooperation.33 In 
addition, Fawcett remarks that although state willingness to cooperate corresponds to their 
capacity, sovereignty plays a central role and imposes constraints.34 Lastly, she supports 
that sovereignty is still important in state matters, and states’ attachment to sovereignty 
permanently governs their commitment to any particular cooperative project in fragile 
                                                 
27 Vayrynen, 522. 
28 Buzan and Waever, “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security,” 43.   
29 Michael N. Barnett, “Regional Security after the Gulf War,” Political Science Quarterly 111, no. 4 
(1996): 597–598, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2152086.pdf. 
30 Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism,” 442.  
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states and new sovereign states that are sensitive to such encroachment.35 Therefore, the 
pessimism shared by scholars emanates from the challenges related to both relations 
between states and internal matters.   
Similarly, Amitav Acharya regrets that military security cooperation remains the 
“least pronounced and effective” realm of regionalism in developing nations even amid the 
emergence of “many security-oriented regional organizations and institutions.”36 Michael 
Handel supports this point and argues that the choice of weak states to align collectively 
increases their defense costs but inversely decreases their efficiency and the reliability of 
their own security.37 This argument makes coordination between military and politics in 
the weak states’ environment particularly difficult because of “technical, logistical, and 
doctrinal reasons ... hierarchies of interests, conflicting priorities and competition for 
leadership and influence within the alliance.”38 Therefore, these scholars despair about the 
likelihood of achieving regional security cooperation.    
Adding to that pessimism on cooperation, Holger Mölder adopts Robert Jervis’s 
realist perspective through his well-known concept of the security dilemma, which 
characterizes the international system as anarchic and based on self-help where states 
perceive the increase in one state’s security as a decrease in others’ security.39 He argues 
that this anarchic nature of international politics creates a competitive environment made 
of fear, where rival powers can threaten another state’s sovereignty, creating the emergence 
basis of a security dilemma.40 For example, a historical example supporting Jervis’s 
arguments is Thucydides’s classical concept of the causes of war asserting that it was 
inevitable as the growth of Athenian power created fear in Sparta, thus acknowledging the 
                                                 
35 Fawcett, 444.  
36 Amitav Acharya, “Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual 
Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations),” Journal 
of Peace Research 29, no. 1 (1992): 7, doi:10.1107/s0108768107031758/bs5044sup1.cif. 
37 Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1981), 154–156, 
doi:10.1107/s0108768107031758/bs5044sup1.cif.   
38 Handel, Weak States in the International System, 154–156. 
39 Robert Jervis, Cooperation under the Security Dilemma, World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 186. 
40 Jervis, 186.  
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existence of a security dilemma in Ancient Greece.41 Citing Michael Howard, Mölder 
remarks that, “the causes of war remain rooted, as much as they were in the pre-industrial 
age, in perceptions by statesmen of the growth of hostile power and the fears of restriction, 
if not the extinction, of their own,”42 The prospect of a security dilemma, according to 
these scholars, makes regional security cooperation almost impossible.  
2. Tentative Definitions of Concepts Related to Regional Security 
Cooperation 
With these contrasting academic opinions in mind, it is valuable to consider the 
differing definitions of concepts related to regional security cooperation that contribute to 
the debate. Bailes and Cottey consider alliances, collective security, security regimes, and 
security communities as at “least four models of regional security cooperation” that carry 
relevant “prima for the 21st century.”43 These scholars define alliances as a form of 
international cooperation, including both military defense and attack, in addressing a 
common external, as well as, internal threat or opponent.44 Cooperation is used “as a means 
to an end rather than a good in itself, and an alliance’s membership necessarily excludes 
the enemy.”45 Supporting the positive side of cooperation, alliance contributes to minimize 
the probability of interstate wars, promotes confidence building, and prevents disputes, and 
promotes their peaceful settlement, which can trigger non-security cooperation.46 
Successful examples of such alliances are the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and NATO.47 Paul M. Evans indicates that the Asia-Pacific countries have 
adapted and responded to the uncertainty of the post-Cold War environment through 
strengthening the capabilities of national military and “outpouring interest in new 
mechanisms for regional cooperation on security matters … including a spectrum of ideas” 
                                                 
41 Mölder, “The Security Dilemma in the Baltic Sea Region and its Impact on the Regional Security 
and Defense Cooperation,” 9.  
42 Mölder, 9. 
43 Bailes and Cottey, “Regional Security Cooperation in The Early 21st Century,” 199.  
44 Bailes and Cottey, 199.  
45 Bailes and Cottey, 199. 
46 Bailes and Cottey, 199, 200. 
47 Bailes and Cottey, 200.  
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in order to build a security cooperation and a coordinated consensus.48 Several new basic 
security arrangements have emerged through a “collective security or concert system” that 
exemplify this cooperation. Among them are NATO for Asia as “a new alliance of the like-
minded,” the cooperation of the United States-Japan-South Korea in enhancing prevailing 
alliance partnerships through multilateral communication, and Cambodia’s efforts to solve 
specific regional problems of conflict through “ad hoc multinational cooperation.”49 
Therefore, the concept of regional security cooperation carries diverse perspectives that 
intensify arguments among scholars.   
The concept of collective security, on the other hand, is relatively new. Bailes and 
Cottey argue that “the concept emerged in the twentieth century in response to the 
ambivalent effects of older-style balance-of-power politics and alliances.”50 The UN falls 
within the framework of the concept as a system aiming to prevent or contain war by 
assuring a collective response to aggression and threats to peace.51 According to Bailes and 
Cottey, the success of such a system requires the inclusion of all regional or world states 
and directs inward attention to their actions.52 Typical examples are the League of Nations 
and the UN from a global perspective and the AU, the Organization of American States 
(OAS), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) from an 
extensive regional perspective.53 Nevertheless, Bailes and Cottey temper their optimism 
and note the limitation of such system to work perfectly because it is evident that the larger 
the membership is, the more difficult it is to reach a consensual judgement and willingness 
to deal with offenders.54 Those authors even recognize, based on experience, that a 
consensus among major powers drives the approach to work well, but if the approach fails, 
                                                 
48 Paul M. Evans, “Building Security: The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
(CSCAP),” Pacific Review 7, no. 2 (1994): 126, 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09512749408719081. 
49 Evans, “Building Security: The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP),” 
126. 
50 Bailes and Cottey, “Regional Security Cooperation in the Early 21st Century,” 200. 
51 Bailes and Cottey. 
52 Bailes and Cottey. 
53 Bailes and Cottey. 
54 Bailes and Cottey. 
   
 
11 
it results in greater dangers in the case of conflicts.55 As a result, regional groups may also 
face some constraints in their quest for security.56 Thus, the will of security actors is a major 
driver for regional and global security cooperation.  
In addition, the notion of a security regime defines a type of regional security 
cooperation through non-security related issues such as regulating of international trade 
and transportation.57 Bailes and Cottey observe, in the definition of norms through security 
regimes, a cooperative and general positive attitude of states’ behavior with the potential 
provision of ways to implement, support, and verify these norms.58 For example, the OSCE 
and some Latin American regional initiatives might fall within the framework of security 
regimes based on their measures for regional arms control, nuclear weapon-free zones, and 
the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.59 The effectiveness of such 
cooperation rests on the high level of respect for the required features, including “internal 
power patterns, institutionalization, incentives, and penalties,” to ensure that states observe 
these norms.60 Consequently, non-security aspects represent important drivers for regional 
and global security cooperation. 
Similarly, a security community, as previously defined, contributes to improving 
regional security cooperation. Bailes and Cottey present Karl Deutsch’s reflection on the 
European integration, emphasizing the far-reaching goals of the post-World War II years 
that turned Europe toward a larger security community of global industrialized 
democracies.61 Even though these security communities help to minimize the potential for 
conflicts within the group, a backlash remains in the tendency to weaken internal frontiers. 
As a result, member states can become vulnerable to such transnational threats as terrorism 
                                                 
55 Bailes and Cottey. 
56 Bailes and Cottey. 
57 Bailes and Cottey. 
58 Bailes and Cottey, “Regional Security Cooperation in the Early 21st Century,” 200. 
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and trafficking.62 Hence, the security community represents an important concept for a 
thriving regional security cooperation. 
3. Regional Security Cooperation and Regionalism  
In an anarchic world characterized by a struggle for power in the international arena 
and “the lack of an international authority capable of enforcing agreements,”63 states pursue 
limited security cooperation in the range of their interests. Ronald D. Asmus argues that 
Norway, as a NATO ally during the period of uncertainty of the Cold War, chose to rely 
on a defense concept of joining an alliance during the crisis period only rather than 
accepting a permanent deployment of foreign troops on its soil because of geographical 
and internal politics factors.64 By contrast, because of the threat represented by Warsaw 
Pact as well as geographic and domestic political imperatives, Germany opted for NATO 
combat troops with a massive permanent peacetime presence.65 The anarchic nature of 
international relations, therefore, constitutes a challenge to regional security cooperation. 
Traditional approaches including a focus on the use of military force and interstate 
politics66 have changed since the end of the Cold War, with more integration of world 
affairs due to globalization and the evolution of the global threats of terrorism. In the wake 
of the Cold War, academic study on security cooperation in general and particularly at the 
regional level has grown as the global system has become less Eurocentric and such 
participants as developing countries got more actively engaged with larger autonomy. The 
result was the shift down from the global level of conflict locus.67 In addition, for example, 
Hussein Solomon and Jakkie Cilliers argue that the combination of “the dynamic and 
                                                 
62 Bailes and Cottey, 201.  
63 Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19, no. 
3 (1994): 50, doi: 10.2307/2539079. 
64 Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, “NATO Expansion: The Next 
Steps,” Survival 37, no 1 (1995), 14, doi: 10.1080/00396339508442774. 
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66 Claire Wilkinson, “The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory 
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historical interplay of domestic, global, political, economic, social, and environmental 
factors” could describe regional insecurity in Southern Africa,68 transcending the capacities 
of individual states and thus requiring a collective response. Therefore, regional security 
cooperation, viewed within the spectrum of regionalism or region, does not build 
consensual views among scholars.  
Buzan argues that even though new threats are being globalized by nature, “there 
is a good case for thinking that the new security agenda will be considerably less monolithic 
and global, and considerably more diverse, regional, and local in character than the old 
one.”69 Martino Gabriel Musumeci argues the concept of a world political system under 
liberal idealists is a cooperation between states guided by international norms and rules, 
including regimes, laws, and human rights as well as other agreements.70 Andrew Hurrell 
notes that despite the ambiguity of the concept of regionalism, a wide range of factors, 
including economy, society, politics, culture, geography, and history, may be important 
features in its growth.71 In conceptualizing regionalism, Bjorn Hettne refers to Hurrell who 
identifies five varieties including “regionalization (informal integration), identity, 
interstate cooperation, state-led integration, and cohesion.”72 Hettne defines regionalism 
through the concept of region as a group of states that share a common geographical region 
with common interdependency.73 He indicates that regionalism could be made up of larger 
continents as well as a cluster of small states situated within the same geographic area.74 
                                                 
68 Hussein Solomon, and Jakkie Cilliers, “Southern Africa and The Quest for Collective Security,” 
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These academic contributions also mean that regionalism or a region defined by geographic 
proximity matters in regional security cooperation.  
4. Securitization Theory and Regional Security Cooperation 
Securitization theory explains the formation of regional arrangements and their 
response to threats agenda.75 Paul D. Williams presents securitization theory as a concept 
built on analysis identifying security references beyond states’ physical integrity, including 
sovereignty or legitimate ideology, national identity, and economy.76 He builds his 
argument on the Copenhagen school perspective that presents securitization as a priority 
over other issues under the decisive responsibility of top leaders without the normal 
political haggling because of the importance, the urgency, and existential nature of the 
subject.77 Claire Wilkinson, also referring to the Copenhagen school of thought, views as 
essential the need to address new security challenges such as migration, transnational 
criminality, and national conflict in all security analysis, while refraining from a move 
toward global and individual approaches to security advocated by some scholars.78  
Williams argues the context of globalism needs to broaden the concept of security beyond 
the military and to include political, economic, societal, and environmental aspects.79 The 
concept of securitization aims to promote regional organization and response to security 
threats.  
Building on scholars’ contribution to regional security cooperation, Waever notes 
that the process of most significant securitization takes place interdependently in the 
framework of the regional security complex rather than at the state level, which contrasts 
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with the view held by traditional analysis and the classical theorists.80 Even though 
previous analysts of the Copenhagen school have focused on national or societal elites, 
Buzan and Wæver depart from that perspective and assert the benefits of the application of 
securitization theory at the regional, societal, or state level.81 Wilkinson points out the 
contrasts between traditionalists and non-traditionalists and argues that while the former 
tend toward the use of military force and politics between states, the latter inclines toward 
the broadening or deepening of the security agenda.82 The diverse views of scholars feed 
the contradictory debate on regional security cooperation. 
5. Theoretical Paradigms and Regional Security Cooperation 
Scholars’ debates on regional security cooperation encompass patterns that are 
more speculative. Bruce W. Jentleson and Dalia Dassa Kaye base their explanation of 
regional security cooperation on theoretical paradigms in considering realist approaches to 
security cooperation, domestic politics explanations, and the status-identity approach,83 
hypothesizing on the concept.  
From the realist perspective, characterized by the motivation of states to promote 
national interests, the perception of regional security cooperation differs. Jentleson and  
Kaye assert that the perspective of traditional realists tends to see imperatives of external 
security as forces largely opposing regional security cooperation.84 They further support 
the realist approach to security cooperation that argues security cooperation is driven 
primarily by the external security environment surrounding a state.85 On the other hand, 
Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein temper this perspective and emphasize “the 
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importance of at least the elemental cooperation of ‘reassurance’ in crisis.”86 Therefore, the 
perspective of regional security cooperation conflicts with the realist approach.  
Also, states’ internal and domestic limitations are important aspects of regional 
security cooperation development. As Etel Solingen emphasizes, the form or nature of a 
state’s governance is an essential explanatory factor influencing security policy, assuming 
that “the democratic nature of states is a fundamental piece of the puzzle in understanding 
conflict and cooperation.”87 Solingen further hypothesizes that political coalitions favoring 
liberal domestic reform policies will engage in regional cooperation, if they view a strong 
commitment in their regional partners.88 By contrast, Steven R. David argues that leaders 
in developing countries are often caught in the balance between internal threats and 
external ones while considering alliance formation, which explains the sometimes 
anomalous alliances these states form with external actors.89 Jentleson and Kaye argue that 
“regional actors” would need “leadership survival concerns, coalitions types or other 
political and economic constraints within the state” to motivate them to “engage” and then 
to refrain from regional security cooperation.90 This debate on domestic-based influence 
certainly explains state behavior toward regional security cooperation.  
Analysts of the status-identity approach argue that the enhancement of a state’s 
security through regional cooperation might also influence negatively its relative standing 
in other ways.91 From a constructivist point of view, though, how a state sees itself in the 
world can influence its interests and involvement in regional security cooperation.92 As a 
result, concerns related to identity-based status can impact negatively on regional 
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cooperation processes, despite the incentives for cooperative arrangements offered by 
strategies or domestic conditions.93 Therefore, regional security cooperation comes with 
advantages as well as possible disadvantages. These overall theoretical paradigms 
presented by Jentleson and Kaye contribute to the debates regarding various aspects of 
regional security cooperation, ranging from the threat environment to internal issues and 
down to nonmaterial characteristics.  
Regardless of how regional security cooperation is defined or interpreted, the 
conclusions indicate differences regarding how to achieve effectiveness in regional 
security cooperation. While some scholars agree that regional security cooperation presents 
many challenges that alter its effectiveness, other scholars claim that regional security 
cooperation is a valuable way to deal with security issues when member states perceive a 
threat at similar levels. Additional perspectives view and evaluate regional security 
cooperation under a broader and more comprehensive approach in terms of geographic 
proximity and the mobilization of member states’ elements of national power. One school 
of thought views regional security cooperation as a single effective aspect to tackle a 
collective threat, whereas an opposing point of view sees it working well while as a 
collective effort. For example, Eric Rosand, Alistair Millar, and Jason Ipe observe that the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) initially focused on development 
“but gradually took on security functions, underscoring the reality of the intimate 
relationship between security and development in the horn of Africa.”94 The organization 
has made tremendous progress through capacity building including legislation and training 
in fighting terrorism in the region.95 Therefore, various supportive and opposing arguments 
surround the concept of regional security cooperation.   
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 POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This research focuses on the effectiveness of regional security cooperation as part 
of the promotion of individual states’ interests through a collective effort. The objective of 
the research is to assess the effectiveness of regional security cooperation as part of a 
response to the security dilemma facing the Sahel states and its benefits as a potential 
alternative to minimize antagonism and conflicts. The thesis investigates several related 
questions. At what level can the mechanism of regional security cooperation gain states’ 
support such that they share the same objectives, considering their diverse interests and 
their divergences? Also, which other possible alternatives that support the military can be 
explored to stir such cooperation? Potential explanations and hypotheses are as the 
following:  
1. Regional security cooperation in the Sahel is generally ineffective as states 
do not perceive the threat in the same way, resulting in a regional 
environment made of suspicion, mistrust, rivalries, and ambiguous 
connections.  
2. Effective regional security cooperation in the Sahel requires a 
comprehensive geographic Sahel–Maghreb approach with the extension of 
cooperation beyond the borders of the current G5 Sahel states and includes 
the remaining Sahel states from West Africa to East Africa as well as the 
Maghreb states in North Africa. The reason is that international terrorism, 
transnational smuggling, and secessionist movements that affect Sahel 
mostly have their roots in the Maghreb.   
3. Effective regional security cooperation requires a comprehensive approach 
going beyond the military by including other incentives that embrace 
fields where every state in the region recognizes or engages its vital 
interests in either development or security.  
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 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis adopts a single case study approach to provide insight into defining the 
types of regional security cooperation that are either effective or ineffective at achieving 
objectives. The thesis examines the Sahel where security cooperation seems to have failed 
so far amid several challenges (such as states perceiving the threat differently, some states 
having little interest in fighting the threats, other states compromising with terrorists in 
exchange for their security, and states saddled by intense regional rivalries). Further, the 
thesis considers failed security cooperation as attributable to the lack of concrete 
expectations. The overall objective is to assess effective regional security cooperation and 
define factors that contribute to successful achievements. The approach analyzes and links 
the theoretical arguments and concepts from the research to the proposed hypotheses 
regarding the types of regional security cooperation. The case study of the Sahel also 
explores forms of regional security cooperation to define causal factors leading to 
effectiveness. Throughout the exploration, the study might find that there are limitations in 
focusing only on security aspects while pursuing effectiveness in such cooperation and 
other factors, such as addressing the root causes of the threat environment, may contribute 
to achieving the desired outcomes. The research relies on primary sources as well as 
secondary academic sources and the author’s personal experience. The exploitation of 
these sources paints the situation in the region and addresses the challenges as well 
potential options for achieving effective regional security cooperation.  
 THESIS OVERVIEW  
The thesis has five chapters, beginning with this introduction. Chapter II examines 
the characteristics of insecurity and instability in the Sahel region. It focuses on the 
geography of the threats including the Sahel and the Maghreb and the historic context of 
the long-standing insecurity and instability in the region. Chapter II also addresses the 
current regional threats represented by transnational terrorism, illicit trafficking, and 
secessionist movements. Chapter III investigates various attempts at regional security 
cooperation in addressing these transnational threats. This chapter focuses on the driving 
factors of regional security cooperation, the successful and failed attempts, and the U.S. 
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led initiatives, as well as the challenges to effectiveness. Chapter IV examines different 
paths to achieving regional security cooperation. The chapter analyzes the U.S., EU, and 
AU strategies for the Sahel under the scope of addressing transnational challenges through 
regional security cooperation. Chapter V presents conclusions and recommendations. 
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II. CHARACTERISTICS OF INSECURITY AND INSTABILITY  
IN THE SAHEL REGION 
The current security situation in the Sahel has risen to a critical and uncertain 
phase with unpredictable insecurity and instability. The region faces some of the most 
serious and growing security challenges in Africa, if not the world, including international 
terrorism, transnational smuggling, and secessionist movements. The characteristics of 
these threats reside in their transnational nature, where terrorists, criminals, and 
insurgencies capitalize on difficult geographic conditions as well as on issues deeply rooted 
in the past, and exploit the global phenomenon of terrorism networks. While the former 
characteristics relate to the position and the environment of the Sahel and its history, the 
latter refer to the exacerbation of existing menaces in the region. This chapter tackles the 
close relationship between the geography of the Sahel and the threats as well as the historic 
context of insecurity and instability that evolved progressively to the current threats in 
the region today.  
 GEOGRAPHY OF THE THREATS 
The concentration of transnational threats in the Sahel results from the prevalence 
of conditions conducive to their development and growth. James Cockayne posits, 
“Geography is partly to blame,” as the Sahel and West Africa have risen rapidly to become 
“a Silicon Valley” for non-state actors’ criminal innovation.96 Criminal groups have 
successfully organized massive trans-Atlantic cocaine trade and criminal markets with 
other forms of lawlessness in the region including criminalized insurgencies, oil bunkering, 
hostage kidnapping, and smuggling of cigarettes, humans, and arms as well as increasing 
secessionist militancy and Islamist terrorism.97 All Sahel countries offer an environment  
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favorable to terrorism that matches Cristiana Brafman Kittner’s theory of terrorist safe 
havens.98 She points out geographic features that ensure inaccessibility of states and favor 
concealed activities as one specific condition necessary for the establishment of criminal 
safe havens.99 This section examines particular geographic characteristics that drive 
insecurity and instability in the Sahel including the region’s sheer size, climate conditions, 
geographical features, and ungoverned spaces.  
1. Sheer Size of the Sahel 
The particular geographical position of the Sahel characterizes its various 
definitions. The Oxford Living Dictionary defines the Sahel as the large semi-desert region 
that slips along the southern border of the North African Sahara desert and comprises its 
northern part under the name of Sudan.100 This definition roughly meets other descriptions. 
Yahia Zoubir, for example, depicts the Sahel as the “region where sub-Saharan Africa 
meets North Africa.”101 Henry Le Houerou points out the Arabic origin of the Sahel as 
“Sahil” meaning “coast” located at the southern border of the Sahara desert with vast flat 
terrain spreading gently through the countryside.102 Similarly, Grégory Giraud defines the 
Arabic origin of the word “Sahil” as “shore.”103 Erik Eckholm and Lester Brown, in 
addition to supporting the Arabic etymological origin, refer to the Sahel as the narrow strip 
bordering the Sahara that has suffered droughts.104 The geographical definition of the  
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region corresponds to the etymological meaning as a transitional zone between the dry 
Sahara and the humid forest. Because geography makes the region a convergent influence 
zone from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, this section describes the Sahel as an 
insecure and unstable region.  
As Figure 1 shows, the Sahel spans eight countries. The region is located at the 
southern edge of the Sahara along a strip 300 to 500 kilometers (km) wide.105 The Sahel 
encompasses the territory from the Atlantic Ocean in West Africa to the Red Sea in East 
Africa through Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria (South), Niger, Chad, 
Nigeria (north), Sudan, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. Alex Whiting asserts that the Sahel stretches 
from the western coast of Africa through Mauritania and Mali to the eastern coast through 
Sudan and Eritrea, and skirts the southern border of the Sahara desert.106 The Sahel equals 
roughly half of the area of the United States.107 The huge size of the Sahel across many 
countries makes the entire region vulnerable to contagious cross-border challenges. Indeed, 
Alfred Grove argues that the boundaries of the Sahel “are not readily definable,”108 
meaning the region is geographically complex. 
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Figure 1. The Sahel region.109 
In addition, the Sahel has complex undefined geographical borders with the 
Maghreb. The Sahel is a natural geographical extension of the Maghreb in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Geography links the two regions although they are distinct. Africa’s Sahara-Sahel 
strip extends across all or part of at least seven nations from Senegal to Chad and is 
considered an integrated region for historical, climatic, economic, cultural, and religious 
reasons.110 The Sahel necessarily involves the Maghreb in view of the inseparable 
geographical considerations of the two regions. Indeed, Robert Vernet argues that the long 
period of dryness during the late Pleistocene divided the Sahara desert “into two great 
ensembles.”111 He states that aridity characterizes areas north of the tropics and the Sahara 
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desert and is spreading progressively on a slow pace toward the southern region and the 
Sahel.112 Furthermore, geopolitical changes in the Sahel directly affect the Maghreb 
countries, given their geographical proximity and their social, ethnic, and religious 
ramifications.113 Because the Sahel is a natural geographical extension of the Maghreb in 
sub-Saharan Africa, it is, therefore, difficult to establish a natural boundary between the 
two regions. As the result, the Sahel suffers the ripple effects of most border challenges 
from the Maghreb.  
Furthermore, the Sahel has undefined geopolitical borders. From a geopolitical 
perspective, Yves Lacoste defines the Sahel as part of the broader Sahara region that 
includes North Africa in the north, Mauritania in the west, the Basin of the Red Sea in the 
east, and Chad in the south.114 On the other hand, the European Union, in its security and 
development strategy for the Sahel, has chosen a more restrictive definition that refers to 
Mauritania, Mali, and Niger as the “three core Sahel states” with extended limits to the 
southern region of Algeria, and the northern part of Burkina Faso and Chad.115 The region’s 
recent significance for policy makers in Washington derives mostly from political, 
economic, energy interests, military, strategic, and security interest considerations, as the 
United States considers the Sahel as the extension of the Maghreb.116 These divergent 
geopolitical considerations, however, do not contribute to frame a common geography of 
the threats scouring the region.  
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2. Climatic Conditions  
The proximity of the Sahel to the Sahara desert submits the region to very dramatic 
climatic and physical conditions. Harsh climatic conditions, such as severe drought and 
desertification, have caused a decline in the environmental setting and habitat in the 
Sahel.117 High temperatures throughout the year, coupled with a scant and unpredictable 
annual 400 to 1,000 millimeter (mm) rainfall during three months, are followed by a nine-
month dry season.118 The region has long suffered from successive droughts, resulting in 
starvation and loss of stock and livestock.119 Sharon E. Nicholson, Compton J. Tucker, and 
M. B. Ba observe that during recent years the “advances” of the Sahara desert closely 
mimic variations in rainfall in the Sahel.120 Furthermore, climate change has forced local 
populations to migrate in the quest of a better quality of life in cities, abandoning their 
traditional way of life.121 The degradation of farmlands and rangelands has posed a 
weightier threat to human welfare as the result of desertification encroachment.122 Erik 
Eckholm and Lester R. Brown argue that the Sahel has drawn world attention because 
environmental deterioration has culminated in human tragedy as the desert has overtaken 
once rich lands.123 The Sahel, amid these shifting climatic conditions that drive an 
unfriendly environment, represents a source of insecurity and instability.  
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3. Geographical Features  
As a result of the continuous decline in climatic conditions, the Sahel has become 
an inhospitable region. Yet, many of the resulting geographical features in the Sahel harbor 
natural sanctuaries profitable to the development of threats. Richard Miniter characterizes 
the region as a desolate landscape with little vegetation and far flat or featureless land rising 
more than 11 feet and falling more than 100 feet below sea level with many ravines, ridges, 
and revetments.124 The Sahel combines large desert spaces with sandy dunes, mountains, 
sparse wooded forests, and oases. Aridity, waterlessness, and underpopulation illustrate the 
main features of the Sahel.125 The Hoggar Mountain chain, which extends roughly over 
8,500 square miles in northeastern Mali along the Algerian border to the Chad-Niger Air 
Mountains, comprises “steep, craggy hills and valleys” as well as “strewn arid riverbeds 
and landscape.”126 Multiple blind spots and gaps favor the expansion and interconnection 
of criminal flows on all sides.127 Sparse and wooded forests along Mali-Niger-Burkina 
Faso, Mali-Mauritania, and Chad-Nigeria-Cameroon borders around the basin of the Chad 
Lake, as well as the Chad-Sudan borders and various oases across the region, constitute 
main refuges for groups looking to conceal themselves or their illegal activities.  
4. Ungoverned Spaces 
Weak countries have struggled to maintain control over their remote and hostile 
spaces in the Sahel as well as their long and porous borders. The description of ungoverned 
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spaces as remote and vulnerable zones that lay beyond the reach of central government128 
illustrates the case of the Sahel countries. Robert B. Lloyd argues that the Sahel constitutes 
a major ungoverned space on the continent where formal governments exercise little or no 
control.129 Secretary‑General of the United Nations António Guterres declared that climate 
change and underdevelopment have contributed to disastrous humanitarian and security 
crises in the Sahel as consequences of the countries’ weakness.130 Poor border control in 
the Sahel has become a danger to international peace and security, and local communities 
in border regions live in a disastrous situation where non-state actors, including terrorist 
groups and drugs, weapons and human smugglers, have overpowered states’ authority, and 
undermined sustainable human development in a multitude of ways.131 Therefore, 
countries’ inability to secure their territories is a main underlying driver of insecurity and 
instability in the Sahel. 
The UN Security Council perceives the Sahel as a “threat to international peace and 
security” in terms of the growing threat of terrorism in the region.132 The Minister for 
Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, Jean Yves Le Drian, argues that drug trafficking 
and human trafficking finance to terrorist groups in the Sahel represent a global threat.133 
Difficulties in countries’ control over their territories have contributed to the development 
of illegal activities, growing illicit trafficking, and increasing violence by transnational 
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Islamist groups such as AQIM and Boko Haram in the Sahel and Saharan border region.134 
They have also posed serious threats to stability, development, and global peace and 
security.135 Therefore, the disastrous situation in the Sahel is the result of worsening 
geographical conditions coupled with countries’ lack of control over their territories.  
 HISTORIC CONTEXT OF INSECURITY AND INSTABILITY  
The evolution of historical dynamics in the Sahel explains the current trend of 
insecurity and instability through different periods. During the pre-colonial period, local 
kingdoms and empires felt unsafe and unsecure with the invasions from the Maghreb as 
the result of the trans-Saharan route and internal political instability. European conquests 
and domination drove insecurity and instability during the colonial period. Uncertainty 
characterized the post-colonial period with the legacy of colonialism including the social 
and political tension born from the colonial ruling systems that divided elites, as well as 
the contemporary security dynamic including the thriving international terrorism, illicit 
transnational smuggling, and insurgencies. This section examines the evolution of 
insecurity and instability from the historic context to the contemporary status.  
1. Pre-colonial Period (5th through 15th Centuries) 
Maghreb conquests through the trans-Saharan roads and wars of succession 
characterized factors of insecurity and instability in the Sahel during the pre-colonial 
period. Regional interaction through trans-Saharan routes and trade subjected the Sahel 
region to deep influence from North Africa. Historically, the Sahel was known as the 
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greatest medieval empires and commercial towns a thousand years ago.136 According to 
Kwesi Aning and Lydia Amedzrator, trans-Saharan trade and the concomitant spread of 
Islam represented historical distinguishing features of interaction on both sides of the 
Sahara desert with deep-rooted political, commercial, and cultural influence in the 
transitional zone of the Sahel.137 Ghislaine Lydon cites Edward Bovill who argues that, 
“Trans-Saharan roads wove ties of blood and culture between the peoples north and south 
of the desert.”138 The historic context of insecurity in the Sahel are captured in the thoughts 
of Pietro Musilli and Patrick Smith who state, “The political, economic and social crises 
that stretch across Africa’s Sahel region are connected via trade routes that were established 
centuries ago.”139 Trans-Saharan roads, the forerunner of the flowering of trans-Saharan 
trade, served as the gateway for conquests and invasions of the Sahel from the Maghreb as 
Figure 2 illustrates.140  
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Figure 2. The trans-Saharan routes.141 
The history of insecurity and instability flows through the Almoravids’ invasion of 
the empire of Ghana, the Moroccan invasion of the Songhay empire, the internal power 
struggle in the empire of Mali, and the attempts of some local Islamic clerks to create 
religious states. 
In the third century, as the result of trans-Saharan routes and trade, the Berberes 
Zenetes’ invasion and influence of the Sahara extended to Senegal and Sudan, current-day 
Mali.142 The copper from the Saharan mines of Takedda found in Djenné in current-day 
Mali and Igbo-Ikwu in current-day Nigeria, dating from before the eighth century, fueled 
the great Arab influence on and expansion of trans-Saharan trade.143 According to Colin 
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Newbury, the main routes included the Niger-Morocco stages through Adrar or Taoudeni 
to Tenduf or Tafilet in current-day Morocco; the central Timbuktu-In Salah-Ghadames-
Tunis or Tripoli road; the ancient route from Chad through the Fezzan to Tripoli; the 
ancient way from the Hausa country through Agades and Ghat, in current-day Niger, and 
the eastern route from Darfur to Cyrenaica.144 These trans-Saharan routes and trade 
resulted in building strong relation between the Sahel and the Maghreb.   
The trans-Saharan routes long served to connect the Maghreb and the Sahel 
kingdoms. The empire of Ghana and Mali, and the kingdom of Takrur, flourished on the 
gold trade from tropical Africa to the Mediterranean.145 The most important avenue of 
long-distance trade through the caravans’ routes between the Mediterranean and the eastern 
Sudan linked Benghazi and Wadai in current-day Chad remained economically viable and 
declined only later with the attack and capture by the French of Ain-Galakathe, the Sanusi 
capital.146 Therefore, trans-Saharan routes that crossed the Saharan desert and connected 
the Sahel to North Africa served as a cultural highway for social integration as well as 
insecurity and instability. 
Consequently, insecurity and instability rose as challenges to local empires and 
kingdoms. The trans-Saharan trade that triggered influence from Maghreb over the Sahel 
ancient states led to the decline of empires such as ancient Ghana. The Almoravids, an 
imperial Berber Muslim dynasty centered in Morocco in the Maghreb, introduced the 
teaching of the Koran in the savannahs of the Sahel,147 strengthening their influence over 
existing empires in the region. A. J. H. Goodwin argues that great empires in West Africa 
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declined following conquests and colonization from the “Maghreb or Mauretanian shores 
of the Mediterranean,” referring to the case of the Ghana empire, which “slowly collapsed 
under the Almoravids rulers in the [12th] century, following their victory of 1076,”148 and 
leading to its disappearance in the early 13th century.149 The collapse of the empire led to 
chaos. Civil wars ravaged the Soninke provinces of Wagadu, Baxunu, Kaniaga, and Nema 
of current-day Mali.150 Trans-Saharan routes became hazardous,151 contributing to political 
instability that led to insecurity and instability through raids and ambushes against 
caravans. Invasions from North Africa constituted a source of uncertainty for the 
indigenous people in the Sahel at the time.  
Furthermore, the introduction and the spread of Islam in the Sahel faced fierce 
opposition, a source of insecurity and instability in the Sahel. The violent introduction of 
Islam in the Africa savannah dates back to the period of the Almoravids from North 
Africa.152 Around the 11th century, the Almoravids, a group originating in Morocco, led a 
“Jihad to purify” and expand the practice of a traditional form of Islam in the kingdoms of 
Ghana in present-day Mali and Takrur in present-day Senegal.153 A perpetual rivalry 
erupted between the Islamized peoples and the animist peoples in the Sahel who rejected 
Islamic precepts. In the middle of the 11th century, after the liberation of the most 
important provinces including Manden (present-day Mali) and Takrur from the domination 
of the indigenous empire of Ghana, Wardjabi, the king of Takrūr, converted to Islam and 
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actively participated in the holy war that the Almoravids unleashed against the indigenous 
regions.154 In 1056, his son Labi perpetuated the policy of alliance with the Almoravids 
and fought the Godala.155 For example, at the end of 12th century, the Sosso people, under 
the Kante dynasty, went to war against Muslims.156 Civil wars tore apart Wagadu, the 
central province; some groups of Soninke, remaining faithful to the ancient rites, fled to 
the province of Nema.157 The brutal Islamization of the Sahel shocked indigenous 
civilization and sparked a trend of unpredictable insecurity and instability. 
These trends did not spare the Mali empire. The empire, born from the ashes of the 
fallen empire of Ghana, knew all its glories under the reign of its first king, Soundiata 
Keita, and his successor Kankou Moussa, before collapsing amid conflicts of succession 
to the throne. Soundiata Keita conquered most former provinces of the Ghana empire, 
including the kingdom of Jolof and Tiramaghanroya in Senegambia, and extended the 
empire up to Casamance and current Guinea-Bissau in the West and Gao and Takrur in the 
East, after establishing a “Constitution” known as the “Kurukanfuga chart” during the 
legitimate Constituent Assembly.158 For the stability of the empire, the charter codified 
customs, traditions, and prohibitions that still govern relations between the Mandenka 
clans, on the one hand, and between those clans and the other clans of West Africa.159 The 
pilgrimage of his successor, Kankou Moussa, to Mecca in Saudi Arabia in 1325 and 
especially his transit to Cairo in Egypt—where he distributed so much gold that the price 
of the precious metal dropped for a long time—made him the best known of the emperors 
of Mali.160 The echoes of his impressive pilgrimage and the reputation of the empire caught 
the interest of external invaders such as Egypt, the Maghreb, Portugal, and the merchant 
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cities of Italy.161 At the death of Kankou Moussa, the resurgence of insecurity and 
instability undermined the prosperity of the empire and led to its collapse.  
A succession struggles led to political tensions and weakened the empire. During 
the 15th century, the empire of Mali declined with the assassination of two emperors in  
two years following the internal struggles over the succession of power.162 Madina Ly-Tall 
recounts that following the death of Mansa Moussa II around 1387, struggles erupted 
between the descendants of Sundiata, the senior branch of the royal family, and the junior 
branch, the descendants of Sundiata’s younger brother, Mande Bory.163 The former 
attempted to regain power from the latter, who had held the throne since the reign of 
Kankou Moussa.164 The Tuareg, the Berbers, and the Songhay troops led the first strikes 
against the empire by taking advantage of these internal tensions.165 Around 1433, the 
Tuareg forayed into and captured the major towns of Timbuktu, Walata, Nema (in current-
day Mauritania), and Gao (in current-day Mali), and took control of their trans-Saharan 
roads, thus marking the collapse of the empire of Mali and the emergence of the Songhay 
empire under the rule of Sunni Ali Ber.166 The empire fell and produced ripple effects of 
political uncertainty and rivalries.  
Despite its early and strong relation with North Africa, the Songhay empire did not 
escape the trend of recurrent insecurity, domestic instability, and invasion. Internal 
uncertainty between the Islamized emperors and the large indigenous population as well as 
the empire’s conquest by North Africa led to the collapse of Songhay. Furthermore, the 
early conversion to Islam of the kings that attracted the literati and Arab-Berber merchants 
did not ease domestic tensions.167 As Islam became the official royal religion under the 
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rule of Dia Kossoi XV, he had to strike a delicate and critical balance between the mass of 
the pagan populace and the Islamized populations.168 Rivalries and tensions raged in the 
empire throughout the rule of Sunni ‘Ali Islam XVIII during which Songhay religious 
system was completely eclipsed and thus Sunni ‘Ali’s authority was destroyed with 
iteven though the rule of Muhammad Toure later completed the Islamization process.169 
The empire reached its apogee under the rule of Askia Daoud between 1549 and 1583 when 
it enjoyed a prosperous economy and intellectual pursuits flourished thanks to the trans-
Saharan caravans that got the best from the Atlantic caravels.170 In the 1580s, the Songhay 
empire conquered the oases of Gurara and Tuwat, as well as the salt flats of Taghaza (in 
current-day Mali), key transit passages to the trans-Saharan trade.171 This ascent was short-
lived, however, as political rivalries rocked the empire.  
The instability born from these succession struggles weakened the empire. The 
succession of Askia Daoud in 1586 created unrest among Songhay princes as the result of 
his brother’s proclamation as emperor.172 The empire rapidly decayed under the rule of 
Muhammad IV Bani, resulting in a civil war that split the empire into two.173 The Balama 
Al-Sadduk with headquarters in Timbuktu revolted.174 Along with other princes, he 
marched on Gao before Ishak II, the Askia of Gao, defeated and decimated the rebellion.175 
Consequently, these internal quarrels of succession weakened the Songhay empire, which 
could not withstand a Moroccan invasion. Under orders from the Sultan of Morocco, Pacha 
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Djouder, a Spanish leader of many Christian clergymen, led a Moroccan expedition that 
attacked Timbuktu and Gao, and defeated the Songhay army on March 12, 1591, during 
the battle of Tondibi (current-day Mali).176 The poverty of the empire disappointed the 
Sultan of Morocco, who turned away from the region and sparked chaos made of 
mercenaries’ brutal exploitation, successions of intrigue, and bloody revolts.177 This 
growing insecurity contributed to the decline of trade as political instability grew in the 
region, leading to the fall of the Songhai empire, civil wars in Bornu (current-day Nigeria) 
and in Fezzan and Agades (current-day Niger), and ultimately, to French colonization.178 
The new unstable environment led to changes in trade itineraries with more considerable 
lateral traffic of oils, cereals, silks, cotton, and leather goods in the Maghreb as well as 
toward sub-Saharan Africa under the control of Moroccan, Tuat, Ghadames, Cha’amba, 
Omadi and Tuareg leaders, agents, and carriers.179 This defeat marked the end of the 
empire, victim of its internal disputes and the external invasion. The fall of these empires, 
among many in the Sahel, demonstrates the climate of uncertainty, insecurity, and 
instability in the region before the European invasion. The trend of uncertainty remained 
almost constant throughout the period of European invasion and colonization. 
2. Colonial Period (16th through 19th Centuries) 
As time went on, Africa in general and the Sahel in particular revolted against 
European imperialist aggression in the forms of peaceful missionary explorations, military 
invasion, and ultimately conquest leading to colonization. The arrival of and the conquest 
by Europeans amplified political insecurity and instability as small established ethnic and 
religious-based kingdoms resisted colonial invasion.  
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Africans rejected European attempts at colonization. Rulers in the Sahel treated 
European conquests as military occupation, particularly where the imposition of white rule 
demanded unconditional submission of Muslim societies to infidels.180 For example, in 
1881, the decision of the French governor Briere de L’Isle to construct a colonial railway 
connecting Dakar to Saint Louis in Senegal met with opposition from Lat Dior, the Damel 
of Cayor in the Senegambia, who realized that the project would lead to the independence 
of the Cayor under the French influence.181 He initiated a holy alliance composed of Ely, 
the Emir of Trarza, Abdul Bokar Kane of Futa Toro, and Alboury N’Diaye from the Djoloff 
to evict the French from the land of their ancestors.182 In December 1881, Colonel 
Wendling led a French expedition in the Cayor, deposited Lat Dior, and enthroned his 
nephew Samba Laobe Fall in August 1883 who was later assassinated in 1886.183 Lat Dior 
led the resistance and inflicted heavy losses on the French and their allies on October 27, 
1886, at the well of Dekhle (current-day Senegal) before his death along with his sons.184 
The resistance fed violence across the Senegambia in response to French colonial 
ambitions.  
In the middle of the 19th century, the Tukulor empire rose to be the regional power 
in Western Sudan, sharing guns and gunpowder with France and Britain; the empire’s 
economy was “based on gold, gum, kola nuts, and textiles.”185 Rulers perceived the French 
policy of military conquest to promote and protect their commercial interests as disruptive 
to trade, political stability, and peaceful coexistence.186  Referring to A. S. Kanya-Forstner, 
Carolyn M. Warner argues that the Tukulor rulers approved of commercial relations with 
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France, but rejected French building and control via gunboat trade posts on Tukolor land.187 
Soon after, in 1864, trade with Europe caused fragmentation and led to a succession of 
crises exacerbated by the French and later dismantled the empire.188 In March and April 
1893, Louis Archinard invaded the territory of Macina, occupied the towns of San, Djenne, 
and Biandagara in current-day Mali, and repulsed the Tukulor sovereigns,189 thus ending 
the rule of the empire. European colonization added to the existing insecurity and internal 
political instability made of succession feuds led to the gradual decline and collapse of 
empires and kingdoms.  
3. Post-colonial Period (1960 to the Present Day)  
The post-colonial period saw insecurity and instability from the independence of 
countries in the 1960s through the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, as well as from the 
global security challenges emerging post 9/11. The wars of secession and tensions born 
from the European balkanization of Africa marked the period after independence in the 
Sahel. These domestic challenges, creating greater insecurity and instability, shook most 
of the Sahel countries. Aïssatou Fall argues that the numerous armed conflicts, including 
bloody coups d’état, rebellions, or violent separatist movements sparked throughout West 
Africa in the aftermath of independence, were secessionist movements that claimed the 
independence of certain ethnic groups or regions.190 The consequences of the balkanization 
of Africa did not spare the Sahel countries. 
These internal crises involved all the Sahel countries. In the 1960s, the most glaring 
examples involved Nigeria and Chad while new secessionist movements rose in Niger, 
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Mali, and Senegal, respectively, in the 1980s and 1990s.191 For example, in 1966, the 
governance of the first Chadian President François Tombalbaye, an autocratic ruler, failed 
to settle a civil war sparked between the government and insurgent Muslim groups from 
the north, known as the Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT).192 The 
violence was a response to interethnic tensions originating from a member of the southern 
Sara ethnic group.193 In 1975, General Felix Malloum killed Tombalbaye during a coup, 
and civil war raged in the country as internal tensions divided FROLINAT in 1976.194 
Political struggles over power created greater instability and insecurity that continued 
through the successive presidencies of Goukouni Oueddei in 1979, Hissen Habre in 1982, 
and Idriss Deby in 1990.195 Uncertainty remained ongoing in Chad as a result of political 
instability. 
The rebellion in Casamance, Senegal, Mali, and Niger represented some examples 
of the numerous civil wars that rocked post-colonial Sahel countries. Since 1982, the 
Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) violently opposed the 
Senegalese government, claiming its sovereignty and territorial integrity inherent in 
independence in 1960.196 Since independence in 1960, Mali and Niger faced ethnic 
tensions linked to the Tuareg who contested the rule of the majority Sudanese ethnic groups 
(Bambara in Mali and Djerma in Niger) and marginalization.197 In the 1980s and 1990s, 
revolt broke out as the result of permanent and growing tensions between the central 
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government and rebel groups.198 The case of these three countries is emblematic of 
insecurity and instability in the Sahel during the post-colonial period.  
Since the end of the Cold War, the Sahel countries have increasingly borne the 
brunt of contemporary global security challenges. The Sahel is part of the EU 
counterterrorism agenda because of the predominant expansion of AQIM’s operations.199 
In addition to the Sahel, other particular geographical areas of the EU agenda include the 
South Asia given the efforts of NATO, the EU, and EU member states in Afghanistan, and 
Yemen regarding the failure of Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s attempt bombing 
on December 25, 2009.200 In addition, most countries in the Sahel faced internal tensions 
and rivalries due to states’ failure to overcome ethnic, political, and religious differences, 
and to form and forge a common sense of citizenship.201 According to an information report 
from the French Senate in 2013, the Sahel remains central in the expanded network of 
classic cannabis, cocaine, weapons, and migrants trafficking.202 The combination of these 
challenges characterizes the complexity of the current security situation in the Sahel. 
 CURRENT SECURITY THREATS IN THE SAHEL 
The prevailing security challenges in the Sahel resemble a duplication of threats 
that scoured the region in the past. The growing influence of Islamist extremists in the 
Sahel has a long historical path.203 The contemporary Sahel has become embroiled in a 
more disastrous security situation with stronger and active non-state actors. The 2017 
annual early-warning report of the International Crisis Group comments that jihadists, 
entrenched criminal networks, and armed groups exploit political and security 
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vacuums across the Sahel putting the region on a trajectory of greater violence and 
widening instability.204 The complexity of the current security situation is reflected in its 
transnational nature coupled with linkages between non-state actors engaged in 
transnational terrorism, which constitutes the greatest threat; the increase of human, 
weapons, and drugs smuggling; and recurrent secessionist rebellions.  
1. Transnational Terrorism  
International terrorism represents the current major and transnational threat in the 
whole Sahel. The harsh legacy of Algeria’s civil war in the 1990s resulted in the emergence 
of AQIM, which has established footholds in the Sahel following Algeria’s containment of 
the radical Islamist insurgency and the successful disruption of North African terrorist cells 
in Europe.205 AQIM is the oldest and most well-known terrorist group operating in the 
Sahara desert and the Sahel.206 The analysis of a jihadist blog posted on May 2013 implies 
that AQIM’s theater of operations stretches from Mauritania in West Africa to the Horn of 
Africa and encompasses groups such as Boko Haram, Ansarul, and Al-Shabaab.207 
AQIM’s rooting in the Sahel represents a direct and immediate security challenge for 
countries in the region and has a major impact on regional geopolitics through its influential 
role in the interests of the Maghreb countries as well as its alleged connection to the 
dynamics between the Sahel and Maghreb.208 From its Algerian origins, the evolution and 
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the progressive influence of AQIM have spread beyond Algeria’s borders. AQIM has 
become the hegemon transnational non-state actor in the Sahel. 
AQIM has also spun off many affiliates that have allied in the Sahel. Carrying the 
leadership of the global terror network in North Africa, AQIM and its notable affiliates—
Ansar Dine, Al-Murabitun, Islamic State in Greater Sahara, and Boko Haram—are active 
in the Sahel countries, mainly in northern Mali and Niger, and other non-Sahel regions 
across northern Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, and Tunisia.209 They operate throughout the Sahel 
with their epicenter in Mali and Niger; Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin between Niger, 
Nigeria, and Cameroon; the Islamic State (IS) in Libya and the region of the “three borders” 
(Mali-Burkina-Niger); and Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa. The most notable affiliates 
include the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar Dine, 
Ansarul Islam, Liberation Front of Macina (FLM)—the name Macina refers to a historic 
Fulani Islamic emirate in the 19th century centered around Mopti and Segou in central-day 
Mali210—and Al-Murabitun, all born as the result of the Malian crisis in 2012. The 
complexity of terrorism in the Sahel resides in the multiplicity of terrorist groups across 
the region. 
Worse, under the impetus of AQIM, terrorist groups connected and strengthened 
their organization and coordination effort. In 2012, key terrorist leaders, including Iyad Ag 
Agaly, Amadou Koufa, and Belmoktar, formed close relationships.211 In 2015, Malian Iyad 
Ag Agaly, founder of Ansar Dine, created and led an alliance that gathered many terrorist 
groups in the Sahel under the name of Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM, 
Group of Supporters of Islam and Muslims) including AQIM, Ansar Dine, FLM, and Al-
Murabitun.212 The new alliance pledged allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Haibatullah, 
Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and leader of Al Qaeda’s North African franchise 
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Abu Musab Abdul Wadud.213 The connection brought “together leaders of multiple ethnic 
groups” including Iyad Ag Ghaly, Tuareg leader of Ansar Dine; Muhammed Kufa, Fulani 
leader of Ansar Dine’s sub-affiliate Katiba in Macina; Yahia Abu Al-Hamam, Algerian-
Arab leader of AQIM’s Sahara region; as well as Abou Abderrahman Al-Senhadji, Berber 
of AQIM’s judge; and Al-Hasan Al-Ansari, a Malian Tangara Arab, deputy leader of Al-
Mourabitun.214 For example, a coalition of AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO helped Tuareg 
rebels seize regions in northern Mali in 2012.215 AQIM strengthens its capacities and 
influence by attracting and nurturing the cohesiveness of several actors of various 
ethnicities.  
The various groups have freely operated beyond their respective country’s borders. 
The ambition to expand within the Sahel has also included the rapprochement between Abu 
Walid Al-Sahrawi, leader of the Islamic State in the Great Sahara, active in the area known 
as the “three borders” (Mali-Burkina-Niger), and Ansarul Islam, the Burkinabe jihadist 
group raging in the northern region of the country.216 The ensuing alliance has claimed 
several attacks in Mali, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The double attacks on the 
French Embassy and the Army Staff in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, in 
March 2018, represented the most daring of these attacks.217 The alliance has federated and 
outclassed AQIM and has continuously coordinated terrorist activities in the Western 
Sahel.  
AQIM has accentuated connections with other notable terrorist groups in the Sahel, 
including Boko Haram in the region of the Lake Chad basin and Al Shabaab in the horn of 
Africa. The November 2011 U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security report 
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remarked that: “Boko Haram’s evolving tactics and targeting may be the result of ties 
between AQIM in North Africa and Al Shabaab in Somalia ... Such cross-pollination of 
weapons, tactics, and bomb-making expertise can quickly increase the capabilities of 
terrorist groups.”218 Nigerian officials pointed to a Nigerian man returning from Somalia 
as the author of the August 2011 attack on the UN building in Abuja claimed by Boko 
Haram.219 Also, changing tactics among insurgent and terrorist groups and the increasing 
attacks in this “arc of instability” revealed their growing relationship.220 The connection 
between major terrorist groups increases the potential of their sophistication with the 
exchange of expertise and experience.  
In addition, AQIM sustains its funding through connections with drugs and 
weapons smuggling as well as kidnapping of Westerners in the Sahel. According to an 
analysis by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Center on Sanctions and Illicit 
Finance, AQIM made around $100 million through ransom and drug trading in 2016.221 
AQIM involvement in smuggling of narcotics as a source of funding has transformed the 
Sahel into a waystation between cartels in Latin America and European markets.222 As a 
result, the group gained access to weapons such as small arms, machine-guns, and surface-
to-air missiles, and facilitated its potential for recruiting.223 Kidnapping for ransom also 
constitutes a major source of funding. Andrew Gilligan presents AQIM as “the richest and 
best-armed offshoot of Al-Qaeda thanks to its tactic of kidnapping Westerners for 
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ransom.”224 Between 2006 and 2011, AQIM collected an estimated $70 million in ransom 
payments from the kidnapping of Westerners for ransom operations.225 According to the 
Algerian journal El-Khabar, in March 2012, Al-Qaeda in the Sahara Emirate “earned 183 
million euros in ransoms.”226 Even more, various terrorist groups have emerged and 
infested the Sahel as the consequence of such connections.  
The threat of AQIM has largely exceeded the borders of the Sahel and the Maghreb, 
respectively, as its main area of operation and origin. Carrying the ideology of international 
jihad based on the fight against regimes deemed anti-Islamic and the institution of Sharia 
states, AQIM has declared its foremost “far enemies” as Spain and France in particular 
because of their historic links and colonial legacy in the region, and for their continuous 
provision of political and military support to local regimes that AQIM opposes.227 In 
foreign travel advice to Algeria, the United Kingdom warns its citizens to remain vigilant 
in Algeria following various AQIM and its affiliates’ attacks.228 In March 2016, AQIM 
claimed a terrorist assault that left 16 people dead including four Europeans on the beach 
in Grand-Bassam in Ivory Coast.229 These assaults against states beyond the Sahel and 
Maghreb borders, as shown in Figure 3,230 demonstrate the strategic vision and ambition 
of AQIM.  
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Figure 3 shows the complexity and the ambiguity of the nexus of terrorism and 
narcotics and human trafficking in the Sahel and the Maghreb.    
 
Figure 3. Linkages between criminality and terrorism231 
The extension of AQIM’s range of action represents its growing evolution from 
being a regional terrorist group to a global threat compared to its notable peers Boko Haram 
and Al Shaabab that focus locally. 
2. Transnational Smuggling  
Smugglers in the Sahel have continued to exploit and benefit from the heritage of 
trans-Saharan roads that had once served as a springboard for prosperous trade between the 
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Maghreb and the Sahel. Aning and Amedzrator maintain that the crisis dynamic in the 
Sahel under the debilitating influence of criminal groups follows a long historical path.232 
Contemporary organized criminal groups deal mainly in drug, weapons, and human 
smuggling. The intense complexity of this transnational smuggling has transformed the 
Sahel into a platform of convergence for international criminal networks. 
The Sahel is an open space for drug smuggling—mainly cocaine and cannabis. 
Yahia Zoubir explains that the Sahel has become a transit hub for drugs from Latin America 
to Europe through Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Morocco, and Algeria.233 The rapid 
expansion of illegal drugs across the Sahel flows through two distinct influxes by diverse 
routes that intersect at times: “South American cocaine to Europe including via Libya and 
Egypt” since around 2005, “and Moroccan cannabis resin to Libya, Egypt, and the Arabian 
Peninsula.”234 Both “the Atlantic coast” and “the desert through the Sahel and Sahara” 
serve as cocaine shipping routes to Europe for Colombian cartels.235 These actors began 
diverting some flights carrying drugs from the West African coast to the uninhabited and 
ungoverned spaces of Mali in the Sahel, strengthening their grip and surveillance in the 
whole West Africa.236 In November 2009, a Boeing 727 from South America with nearly 
ten tons of cocaine crashed in North Mali, evidencing the shifting patterns of cocaine 
transport.237 Around 15 percent of global cocaine production, representing 80 to 100 tons 
annually, transits through the region.238 The extension of drug smuggling beyond the Sahel 
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borders explains the transnational dimensions of the threat and its sophistication as the 
region serves as a highway for intercontinental trafficking.  
The increasing intensity of drug smuggling in the Sahel constitutes a serious threat 
to regional countries. According to a 2013 U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) report, drug trafficking “threatens political, economic, and social development: 
it can foster corruption and violence, undermine rule of law and good governance, 
jeopardize economic growth, and pose potential public health risks.”239 Stephen Harmon 
argues that drug trafficking is a “potential for instability” in the Sahara-Sahel region.240 
The 2004 Report of the UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Changes entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibilities indicated that 
transnational drug smuggling posed an increased security threat to both individuals and 
states.241 The UN Security Council, in December 2013, similarly noted that drug trafficking 
has contributed to undermine particularly states’ authority, security, stability, governance, 
social and economic development as well as rule of law in the Sahel.242 The nature of illicit 
trafficking as a transnational activity carries potential economic and judicial risks, 
respectively, of exposition to criminal networks of “seizure and consequent financial 
loss,… non-compliance of other criminal business partners to ‘contractual agreements,’ 
[and] the possibility of criminal prosecution and consequent sentencing.”243 Thus, the 
challenges posed by transnational drug smuggling have seriously affected security in the 
Sahel.  
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More importantly, drug-smuggling networks derive strength from complex 
networks that serve the interests of such non-state actors as terrorist and secessionist 
groups. The flexibility, global outreach, and amorphous structure of criminal networks in 
the Sahel have ensured their success.244 Ricardo Larémont argues that AQIM’s survival in 
the region depends on its economic and symbiotic link with local Tuareg and Bérabiche 
tribes involved in clandestine contraband of various products such as cocaine, cannabis 
resin or hashish, and counterfeit tobacco as well as human beings.245 The recent entry of 
AQIM into airborne cocaine trafficking has brought a new dynamic to the collaboration 
between smugglers and terrorists in the Sahel.246 In 2009, the Director of United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Antonio Maria Costa, remarked that in addition to 
terrorist groups, rebel groups in the Sahel harness resources from drug trafficking to 
finance their operations, buy equipment, and pay their troops.247 Extreme and profitable 
contraband traffic in cocaine has exacerbated the mix of transnational smuggling.248 All 
these non-state actors earn great benefits through drug smuggling in the region.   
The large sums of money generated by drug smuggling drive non-state actors in 
this trafficking. UNODC estimates that about $1.8 billion in cocaine—or about 25 percent 
of Europe’s annual cocaine consumption—goes through West Africa and the Sahel.249 
These enormous revenues largely exceed the annual military budget of almost all Sahel 
countries, as in the case of the $183 million Malian military budget, the largest in the Sahel 
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countries, and close to the $5.3 billion Algerian military budget in 2009.250 Therefore, 
money remains the major motivation of drug smuggling in the Sahel. 
Like drug smuggling, transnational human trafficking has also represented a 
regional security threat, particularly with the migration of despairing youth from conflict 
zones and poor regions of Sub-Saharan Africa across the Sahel strip toward Europe via the 
Mediterranean coast. Human smuggling has become an increasingly lucrative and 
flourishing enterprise.251 This traffic has dangerous connections with organized criminal 
groups and the enormous incomes that they generate. For example, the Tebu in Chad, with 
ties in Libya, Niger, and Sudan, have taken advantage of human smuggling and earned as 
much as $60,000 per week, resulting in the expansion of their territory “from Agadez in 
Niger to Al Kufra in Libya and east from Lake Chad to the Salvador Triangle on the border 
with Mali.”252 The new territorial expansion allowed the Tebu to fund the purchase of arms 
through their illegal activities, resulting in violent clashes with the Tuaregs, another 
dominant nomadic tribe in the region.253 In addition to the Tebu, the Tuaregs dispersed in 
Algeria, Mali, Niger, and Libya are also important lynchpins in the trans-Saharan human 
smuggling network that remains a security challenge in the Sahel as it has fueled 
instability.254 Like the large sums of money originating from drugs, the revenue from 
human trafficking has fueled insecurity and instability in the Sahel.  
Similarly, transnational weapons smuggling has fueled insecurity in the Sahel. 
From drug traffickers to terrorist and secessionist movements, this traffic has remained the 
center of gravity of their operational and tactical capabilities. Francesco Strazzari and 
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Simone Tholens point out that local countries and the international community are 
concerned about the uncontrolled proliferation of weapons and their accessibility to 
criminal groups and insurgencies, which has contributed to the rise of new armed groups 
across various conflict fronts in the Sahel.255 The spectacular terrorist attack against the 
gas complex of Tiguentourine, in Amenas, in Algeria involved smuggled weapons from 
the Libyan civil war.256 The Sahel has faced weapons smuggling mainly from conflict 
zones. These zones included the Western Sahara since 1975, Aouzou’s strip between Chad-
Libya in the 1980s, the civil war in Algeria in the 1990s, Darfur and South Sudan in Sudan, 
the Malian crisis 2011 and 2012, and mainly the civil war in Libya in 2011 following the 
collapse of the Gaddafi regime. According to the Washington Post, in 2012, the Malian 
insurgency used smuggled weapons from a Libyan arsenal to seize northern regions, and 
Boko Haram militants who participated in these operations returned to Nigeria with Libyan 
heavy weapons that served them in the Malian conflict.257 The regional and international 
dimension of weapons smuggling connected to criminal and armed groups has raised major 
security challenges among Libya’s neighbors as guns proliferation from the country has 
rekindled local conflicts in the Sahel.258 In sum, smuggling represents as complex a threat 
as transnational terrorism and insurgencies because the multiple actors involved and their 
immense interests oppose regional countries’ interests.  
3. Secessionist Movements 
Countries in the Sahel have continued to deal with claims of secessionist 
movements born in the aftermath of independence. For example, in Mali, a recurrent 
Tuareg insurgency surfaced when 150 Tuareg officers and soldiers seized their serving 
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military camps in Kidal and Menaka and deserted with their weapons and army vehicles 
on May 23, 2006.259 After 30 years of rebellion in the southern region, the Casamance 
conflict remained an unhealed sore for Senegal.260 In February 2008, a rebellion resurfaced 
in Chad and aimed to topple President Deby before the uprising was defeated with French 
support.261 The insurgencies have remained active with intermittent insecurity despite the 
evolution of their claims and methods over time.  
The insurgencies have adapted over time to the new security environment and have 
created connections beyond national borders. Internal secessionist movements contesting 
central authority have overflowed into neighboring countries and beyond with 
transnational connections creating regional security challenges. The conflict in Casamance 
in Senegal for example, has spilled over into Gambia and Guinea Bissau where rebels 
groups have reappeared, creating tension between neighboring countries.262 Although it 
has not reached the level of violence of other Sahel conflicts, the insurgency has left a 
fertile, beach-fringed chunk of land wedged in Casamance between northern Gambia, and 
southern Guinea-Bissau has been stuck in a situation of “neither war nor peace.”263 The 
African liberation forces in Mauritania (FLAM) has remained passive along the southern 
border of the country with Senegal.264 This political movement created in 1980 has accused 
Mauritania’s Moorish-dominated governments of promoting a form of “apartheid “against 
black Mauritanians and often carried out sporadic, small-scale guerrilla operations in the 
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south of the country.265 The prevailing ramifications of internal crises spilling into 
neighboring countries have been felt throughout the whole Sahel. Indeed, the transnational 
nature of these insurrections makes them regional insecurity and instability drivers.  
The multi-dimensional crisis in Mali in 2011 and 2012 represented the worst recent 
case where the spread of internal threats, including terrorism, drug, and weapons smuggling 
as well as political tension, reached the regional level. Mali experienced a military coup 
d’état carried out by a group of junior officers that consequently led to the fall of the three 
administrative regions of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. The territory came under the control 
of a coalition of secessionist National Movement of the Liberation Azawad (NMLA) and 
terrorist groups that allied and fought the Malian army.266 NMLA connections far exceeded 
the borders of Mali from where the movement fought the Malian army. Conflict in Mali, 
in its turn, came as “the result of escalation and diffusion and contagion mechanisms from 
the Libyan Civil War.”267 The Libyan conflict spilled over national borders and 
exacerbated the crisis in Mali with connections between the secessionist movement of the 
NMLA, terrorist groups, and the Tuareg military diaspora in Libya. The latest Tuareg 
rebellions came as the result of increasing destabilization of the Sahara-Sahel region since 
2003, with its epicenter in the northern regions of Niger and Mali.268 The spectrum of the 
current failing and failed nature of countries in the Sahel having the transnational traits of 
internal tensions bears similarities with the decline and the collapse of early empires.  
The threat of secessionism has spared only Burkina Faso. The country has never 
experienced internal secessionist claims since independence in 1960. Multiple military 
coups d’état, sources of political instability, have never degenerated into territorial claims. 
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The country has kept its homogeneity despite internal tensions. Still, the overflow of the 
Malian crisis of 2012 into the country has disrupted its tranquility following alleged 
obscure connections between non-state actors and the regime of President Blaise Compaore 
at the time. In November 2017, President Roch Kabore blamed his predecessor Blaise 
Compaore of “collusion” with the jihadists who fueled the Malian crisis.269 Burkina Faso 
has suffered the consequences of its ambiguous connections to the Malian Tuareg rebellion 
in 2012. 
In sum, the disastrous security situation in the Sahel is the result of the combination 
of cross-border threats, including especially international terrorism, smuggling, and 
secessionist movements. Their transnational nature undermines actions to overcome them 
and challenges states’ authority as well as the foundation of nations in the region, and the 








                                                 
269 Christophe Ayad, “Le président burkinabé met en cause les «Collusions» de son prédécesseur avec 
les djihadistes,” [The Burkinabé president puts in question the "collusions" of his predecessor with the 
jihadists], Le Monde Afrique, November 6, 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/11/06/le-
president-burkinabe-met-en-cause-les-collusions-de-son-predecesseur-avec-les 
djihadistes_5210917_3212.html#jKfOBekKSkh1lb6V.99.  
   
 
56 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
   
 
57 
III. ATTEMPTS AT REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION 
IN THE SAHEL 
The Sahel countries have collectively reacted to the growing transnational threats 
within the region, organizing themselves according to their respective capacities to meet 
the security challenges in the region. Their degree of commitment, expression of political 
will, and support from their international partners, respectively, have determined the 
outcome of the different attempts at regional security cooperation. This chapter examines 
factors that have fostered regional security cooperation and assesses some of the successful 
and failed regional cooperation attempts, U.S.-led initiatives, and the challenges to 
achieving effective and efficient cooperation by transcending the countries’ rivalries, 
which constitute the main obstacles. 
 FACTORS THAT FOSTER REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION 
Three primary factors have driven Sahel countries to attempt regional security 
cooperation. The first factor is the growth of transnational threats, mainly from AQIM and 
its affiliates that have progressively established themselves in the Sahel as well as the 
Maghreb, threatening local governments. According to John Rollins, the primary terrorist 
threat in the Sahel and North Africa is AQIM, its affiliates, and its related cells,270 which 
spread progressively through the Algerian Saharan provinces and hold training camps in 
the neighboring Sahel countries.271 This transnational dynamic reflects both the complexity 
and ambiguity of the AQIM threat.  
Second, in addition to security challenges, the Sahel countries share a wide range 
of internal problems, including youth unemployment, lack of education and opportunity, 
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poverty, and drought that have contributed to the deterioration of regional security 
conditions and the cooperation to resolve such. Sahel countries have realized that success 
in overcoming these governance issues lies in their cooperation, which is also more 
credible in the eyes of the international community. Collective and successful efforts to 
deal with poverty and infectious disease, to end transnational activities, to carry out post-
civil war reconstruction, and to minimize terrorist threats and the spillover of dangerous 
materials require partnership between responsible states.272 The awareness of the Sahel 
countries about the homogeneity of their security problem represents a positive step in 
improving cooperation. 
Third, while countries in the region did not always fully perceive the rising security 
challenges as a major threat to their national security, the international community and 
Western powers, including the United States and the European Union, have long advocated 
for regional security cooperation. According to the World Politics Review, in June 2017, 
the UN Security Council welcomed and approved a resolution plan for Mauritania, Mali, 
Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad to combat extremist militant groups across the Sahel.273 In 
recent years, incentives for security cooperation have originated from local governments’ 
initiatives as well from external initiatives. For example, Algeria is a key player in security 
cooperation in the Sahel, given its central geographic position at the crossroads between 
the Mediterranean, the Arab World, and Sub-Saharan Africa.274 Algeria also has strong 
diplomatic influence because the country is a member of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, the Arab League, the African Union, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, and is the economic and military leader in 
the region.275 Because of its influence, Algeria plays a central role in whether cooperation 
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succeeds or fails in the Sahel. Considered “as a distinct and integrated region,” the Sahel-
Sahara regions experienced securitization initiatives ranging mainly from “Algeria’s 
attempts to control its own Saharan reaches,” to “a series of U.S.-led primarily military 
programs.”276 In addition, securitization initiatives also include remarkable missions in 
Somalia and the Basin of the Lake Chad that were led by regional countries. The 
deterioration of the security environment motivated the reaction of the Sahel countries 
toward regional security cooperation initiatives.  
 FAILED ATTEMPTS AT REGIONAL COOPERATION  
In the Sahel, countries’ different national and geopolitical interests have influenced 
their perception of transnational threats, have revived traditional regional rivalries and 
competitions, and have caused some regional security cooperation attempts to fail. These 
initiatives include the Joint Operational Staff Committee (CEMOC) between Algeria, Mali, 
and Mauritania and the Fusion and Liaison Unit (UFL) between Algeria, Burkina-Faso, 
Niger, Nigeria, Libya, Mauritania, Chad, and Mali. 
1. CEMOC 
Some of the Algerian-led initiatives to achieve regional security cooperation have 
failed to achieve their expected objectives. These Algerian efforts, perceived as a tool 
serving Algerian interests, combined with participant states’ weakness, might explain the 
failure.277 CEMOC has borne the stigma of Algeria’s domination, influence, and political 
manipulation in the Sahel, and it failed as a whole.278 CEMOC’s creation fell within the 
framework of regional security cooperation in the Sahel’s war on transnational terrorism. 
This military staff structure created on April 21, 2012, regrouped the armed forces of 
member countries under the leadership of Algeria with headquarters in Tamanrasset in 
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southern Algeria, aiming for the deployment of 75,000 troops by the end of 2012 to localize 
and destroy terrorist groups.279 From its creation in 2012 to the present, CEMOC has failed 
at the political, operational, and tactical levels.  
CEMOC never really had a chance because it was led by Algeria, which carries a 
stigma. Politically, the member countries have not committed any major or concrete actions 
for its operationalization. The organization lacked a clear political framework as well as 
proper funding. Member countries that consented to join the organization did so without 
any further subsequent actions; their membership remained the sole political commitment 
to the organization and has faced criticism. In September 2011, Niger’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Mohamed Bazoum, called CEMOC “the masquerade of Algerian 
counterterrorism.”280 He declared Algeria’s advocated Joint Military Headquarters, 
established in Tamanrasset in April 2010 to counter terrorism and crime in the Sahel, had 
been ineffective; in particular, he noted that CEMOC had not conducted any operation.281 
The organization also lacked trust from some key regional countries and the support of 
international partners because of the stigma associated with Algerian domination. 
Therefore, the stillborn CEMOC possessed little chance to perform any achievements.  
Operationally, the lack of orientation and political commitment has negatively 
affected the operational and tactical levels, reducing CEMOC to a bureaucratic 
organization. The main actions at the operational level have included periodic meetings of 
the committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the member countries to examine the security 
situation in the region. Their last meeting dates back to August 15, 2017, in Nouakchott, 
Mauritania, with the purpose to analyze the security situation in the Sahel region and 
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learned lessons from the previous meeting held on October 28, 2016, in Bamako, Mali.282 
The series of high-level meetings has not resulted in any major, active decisions. From its 
creation to today, CEMOC has not mobilized forces or planned and coordinated a single 
operation on the ground. CEMOC has quickly showed its limits and remained an empty 
shell by reducing its ambitions to the maintenance of a figurative and non-operational 
headquarters. Therefore, inaction has contributed to CEMOC’s failure.  
Tactically, CEMOC’s ambitions to deploy 75,000 men and to conduct border 
patrols have fizzled almost entirely. A few officers from the four member countries have 
staffed the tactical headquarters, grouped in brand new air-conditioned buildings in 
Tamanasset, in southern Algeria.283 The inactivity of the tactical headquarters has 
characterized the failure of CEMOC’s decisional process. Although the organization 
continues to exist theoretically, this Algerian-led regional initiative has failed miserably 
due to the lack of political will and the disinterest of international partners.  
2. UFL  
Like CEMOC, the ambitions of the UFL’s initiative, which began with the best 
intentions of the member countries and thus raised hopes, quickly degraded due to the lack 
of tangible results. The UFL is an expanded regional information-sharing initiative among 
the Sahel countries aimed at strengthening the capacity of CEMOC. The organization falls 
within the framework of regional coordination and intelligence sharing in the war on 
transnational terrorism. For goodwill, during a meeting, the heads of the intelligence and 
security organizations of the seven Sahel countries called “Les Pays Du Champ” (The 
Countries of the Field) created the UFL on April 6, 2010, with its headquarters in Algiers 
to coordinate the war on transnational terror and counter terrorist propaganda.284  
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The organization grew out of the March 2010 recommendations of the Foreign 
Ministers of the seven countriesincluding Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina-
Faso, Libya, and Chadto combat the growing terrorist threat in the Sahel.285 Nigeria 
initially declined to join but later accepted the offer in November 2011 because Boko 
Haram posed a threat in the north of the country.286 Nevertheless, the Algerian-led 
organization has struggled to gather member countries’ deep commitment as well as strong 
external support. 
Overall, the achievements of the UFL have not satisfied its members, and hope has 
seemingly faded with regard to results. For example, in 2012, following the collapse of 
Mali’s northern regions into the hands of terrorist, secessionist, and criminal groups, critics 
rose against the organization for its lack of foresight.287 Some European leaders also 
perceived CEMOC and UFL as “empty shells,” doubting the Algerian commitment to 
achieve security in the Sahel288 and undermining both organizations’ likelihood to achieve 
any substantial results.  
Both CEMOC and UFL failed to achieve the main objective of bolstering military, 
security, and intelligence cooperation in the war against extremism and responding to the 
Malian crisis in 2012.289 Terrorist networks and actions have multiplied, and organized 
crime has reached unexpected proportions throughout the region. AQIM’s violent activities 
including operations in northern Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and southern Algeria, as well as 
the kidnapping of foreigners and smuggling of cars, cigarettes, arms, and drugs, have 
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reached an alarming height in recent years, creating instability in the Maghreb and Sahel.290 
The progressive degradation of the security situation in the whole Sahel, coupled with the 
2012 Malian crisis, has largely illustrated the failure of these two regional initiatives.  
 SUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS AT REGIONAL COOPERATION 
Countries’ willingness and strong commitment to collectively address regional 
security challenges, coupled with the support of international partnerships, has led to the 
success of some regional security initiatives. These initiatives have contributed to reduce 
significant terrorist threats in their area of operation. Among others, these successfully 
implemented initiatives include African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the Horn 
of Africa against Al Shabaab, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko 
Haram in the region of Lake Chad, and the recently born G5 Sahel against AQIM and its 
affiliates in five Sahel countries.  
1. AMISOM  
AMISOM is an effective model of regional security cooperation that is holistically 
succeeding against Al Shabaab. The initiative falls within the framework of the AU 
Constitutive Act and its Protocol on the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for effective 
conflict prevention, management, and resolution.291 The AU PSC created AMISOM on 
January 2007, with the approval of the AU and the UN, with the first and sixth points of 
its mandate, respectively, to reduce and to conduct continuously offensive operations 
against Al Shabaab threats and other opposing armed groups.292 The May 2017 London 
Security Pact and the August 2017 UN Security Council Resolution 2372 directed 
AMISOM and its partners in building a Somali-led security sector in terms of capacity, 
accountability, acceptability, and affordability in order to forecast the withdrawal of 
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AMISOM.293 AMISOM has showed remarkable progress within the execution of its 
mandate.  
Politically, AMISOM sparked unprecedented regional, continental and 
international support. The initiative drove the contribution of active troops and police at 
the continental level from four immediate neighboring countries of Somalia including 
Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia, as well as West and South African 
countries including Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Zambia.294 The initiative draws its 
strength from the strong mobilization and support for its cause at the African continent 
level. 
In addition, international support encompasses various resolutions of the United 
Nations Security Council and EU assistance. After the initial resolution in 2007, the UN 
Security Council updated additional resolutions in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016, and 
2017.295 A variety of sources providing funding range from the UN Assessed Peacekeeping 
Budget, the UN Trust Fund for AMISOM, the UN Trust Fund for Somali Security Forces, 
the AU Peace Fund, and external partners, the most significant of which is the European 
Union, which supported logistics for uniformed personnel, “totaling approximately €163 
million in 2012.”296 The success of AMISOM resides mainly in the wide range of political 
and financial support from the regional countries as well as from the international partners.  
Along with the military primacy, AMISOM encompasses political and 
development incentives. In addition to fostering security conditions, the mandate of 
AMISOM extends “in supporting the Somali government and its institutions in their efforts 
to stabilize the country, advancing the process of dialogue and reconciliation, facilitating 
the provision of humanitarian assistance, and creating conditions for long-term stability, 
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reconstruction and development in Somalia.”297 AMISOM built its objectives around a 
comprehensive approach addressing the threat as a whole in order to set conditions 
favorable for political, economic, and development integration.  
Operationally and tactically, AMISOM successfully planned, coordinated, and 
conducted operations and directed actions on the ground. The coherence of action among 
the international, regional, national, operational, and tactical levels drove AMISOM to 
great achievements in addressing insecurity in the region. These achievements have 
included institution building such as “a new interim Constitution, the inauguration of a new 
Federal Parliament, and the swearing in of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President of the 
Federal Republic of Somalia on September 10, 2012.”298 The Somali National Army 
(SNA) with the support of AMISOM has achieved tactical success including the effective 
eviction of Al-Shabaab militants and insurgents from most major urban centers, such as 
the capital city Mogadishu in southern Somalia, and Baidoa and the port cities of Kismayo 
and Marka in South-Central Somalia.299 As a result, Al Shabaab has lost a lot of territory 
and capacity, which has subsequently reduced its influence. Furthermore, the success 
brought Somalia back as a world nation. 
2. MNJTF 
Like AMISOM, MNJTF has largely contributed to reducing the threat, the 
influence, and the activities of Boko Haram in the region of the Lake Chad between Chad, 
Nigeria, and Niger. The spread of Boko Haram threats beyond its Nigerian origins 
motivated the strengthening of regional security cooperation and the creation of MNTF, 
which specifically aims to address the transnational threat. According to Virginia Comolli, 
in 2014 and 2015, violence related to Boko Haram escalated with new characteristics 
including female suicide attacks, frequent abductions, and the seizing of towns and villages 
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with the death toll rising to 15,000, worrying countries in the region.300 Virginia Comolli 
explains that Boko Haram’s expansion reached beyond Nigeria’s borders, having a 
substantial aggressive presence in Cameroon and targeting Niger and Chad.301 MNJTF has 
been a strong tool that carries regional countries’ willingness to degrade the threat of Boko 
Haram.  
Countries’ political and military commitment explains the sudden rise in power and 
the deployment of MNJTF. The initiative of regional security cooperation among Lake 
Chad Basin countries through MNJTF, headquartered in Ndjamena, Chad, dates back to 
1998.302 Incentives to grant better funding and the authorization of the African Union for 
the deployment of the force by the end of July 2015 led MNJTF to gain a better operational 
coordinated capacity of up to 10,000 troops.303 According to a 2016 report of the Institute 
for Security Studies, MNJTF estimated countries troops’ contribution as 150 for Benin, 
2,450 for Cameroon, 3,000 for Chad, 1,000 for Niger, and 3,000 for Chad.304 Hans de 
Marie Heungoup, a Cameroonian security expert with the International Crisis Group 
assesses MNJTF’s initiatives as illustrating the African countries’ ability to handle their 
own real security challenges.305 He indicates the seriousness of the threats of Boko Haram 
made with thousands of fighters, and praises the efforts of African countries in dealing 
effectively with the situation without almost any support from Western countries.306 The 
regional political leadership’s perception of Boko Haram as a common threat has enabled 
MNJTF to thrive.  
Additional political incentives included the signature in March 2014 of a deal to 
increase the coordination of border policing and intelligence sharing among the directors-
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general of the external intelligence services of Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, 
alongside France.307 With political will and international support, MNJTF quickly gained 
momentum and achieved full operational capabilities and concrete tactical actions on the 
ground. These joint efforts have reduced the influence, propaganda, and expansion of the 
terrorist threat in a significant way. Boko Haram has suffered intense attacks since 2015 
that have weakened its capacities. The Nigerian Minister of Information, Lai Mohammed, 
declared that following the major defeat of Boko Haram, the group lacked capacity to 
conduct traditional horrendous attacks and has been dislodged from the area it previously 
controlled.308 In an interview with the BBC, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari 
emphasized the success and argued it was a technical win in the war against Boko Haram 
because the security situation improved, allowing people to go back to their 
neighborhoods.309 The establishment of MNJTF has helped to reverse the fear of complete 
collapse and sparked renewal perspectives in the region.  
The actions of MNJTF have helped improve the overall security situation in the 
region. The gradual return of normalcy to the devastated areas resulted from the complete 
dislodging of Boko Haram from the region under its control.310 In July 2015, commercial 
operations resumed in the international airport in Maiduguri after its shutting down in 
December 2013 following attacks on the military and the air force base close to the 
airport.311 In September 2016, the popular cattle market of Damboa in Borno state, closed 
since 2014, reopened.312 In northeast Nigeria, the celebration of Eid without fear of bomb 
attacks for the first time in five years largely illustrated improvement of the security 
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situation.313 The International Crisis Group also noted the significant reduction in the 
group’s attacks as well as the serious depletion of its equipment, including its fleet of four-
wheel-drive and armored vehicles.314 As a result, MNJTF drew the attention of external 
actors. In July 2017, Florence Parly, French Minister of Armed Forces, visited MNJTF’s 
leadership, praised the success, and forecast the initiative as model in combating AQIM in 
the Sahel through the G5 Sahel.315 The creation of an environment conducive to regional 
security cooperation, including the political will and the support of its partners, has 
determined the success of MNJTF. 
3. Joint Force G5 Sahel 
The G5 Sahel, the latest regional security initiative to combat transnational threats 
in the Sahel, has attracted strong regional, continental, and international support that 
strengthens its ongoing operationalization and augurs its success. The experience 
represents African countries’ new attempt to take on responsibility for their own 
security.316 The G5 Sahel launched on July 2, 2017, is defined as the Joint Force deployed 
by the regional organization G5 Sahel with 5,000 troops and with the mandate to “combat 
terrorism, drug trafficking and human trafficking.”317 The G5 Sahel draws its relevance 
from its member its countries’ willingness and its comprehensive approach that combines 
security and development considerations.  
The G5 Sahel falls within the framework of regional security and development 
coordination among Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Chad to undermine the 
growing transnational threats and achieve prosperity and peace. In September 2016, the 
initiative of the G5 Sahel Permanent Secretariat was tasked with developing a special 
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strategy called the “Strategy for the Development and Security of G5 Sahel Countries,” 
which illustrated the commitment member countries’ leadership.318 The president of Chad, 
Idriss Deby, declared that the multidimensional relationship built through the long history 
between the people of the Sahel reinforced regional countries’ engagements to build a 
peaceful, prosperous, harmonious region.319 He acknowledged the inseparable 
interdependence between security and development challenges and advocated the 
willingness of regional countries to confront the situation.320 On July 2, 2017, during the 
G5 Sahel meeting in Bamako, French President Emmanuel Macron emphasized on the 
necessity of a larger development project as part of security efforts in addressing security 
challenges in the Sahel and the need for concrete actions rather than rhetoric.321 The 
coherence and strength of political support are the backbones of the initiative’s success.  
The G5 Sahel built its central mission on the principle of the inseparable link 
between security and development. According to President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz 
from Mauritania, no lasting development exists without security and vice versa.322 He has 
praised regional countries’ agreements in uniting their efforts in order to tackle both 
security challenges and enduring development in the Sahel.323 Both external support and 
the increased military presence are essential in the potential represented by the 
comprehensive agenda of the G5 Sahel in countering terrorism and preventing irregular 
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migration.324 The central focus on human security with a “strong support to people-
centered civilian component” and the involvement of local civil society exemplify 
priorities given to development and governance.325 Along with the political will of the 
member countries, the pertinence of the comprehensive approach of the G5 Sahel 
combining security and development explains its rapid rise and its ongoing 
operationalization.  
Furthermore, the G5 Sahel’s relevance has helped the initiative gain substantial 
worldwide financial support essential to its operationalization. This initiative, although in 
the construction phase, has already attracted the favor of and support from international 
partners. The commitment of Germany and the EU along with France during a summit in 
Paris on December 13, 2017, aimed to mobilize further financial and equipment support 
for the force.326 The international conference in Brussels on February 23, 2018, to finance 
the military component of the G5 Sahel exceeded hopes as the outcome of the meeting 
registered a pledge of €414 million out of the €423 million for 2019.327 The United States 
pledged $60 million to support the G5 Sahel with the expectation that the countries in the 
region will take on full regional ownership “within a three to six year period, with 
continued U.S. engagement.”328 The Arab Organization for Agricultural Development 
(OADA) and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) have 
provided technical and financial support up to $325,000 to fund primary studies targeting 
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sustainable development projects in the G5 Sahel countries.329 This strong mobilization of 
external partners, essential to the success of the G5 Sahel, illustrates the relevance of the 
initiative.  
The ongoing political progress has trickled down to the operational and tactical 
level. On September 9, 2017, in Sevare, Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta 
inaugurated Mali as the headquarters of the force that the Malian Major General Didier 
Dacko heads as the commander of the G5 Joint Force; a senior officer from Burkina Faso 
is his deputy, and the Chief of Staff is from Niger.330 The chiefs of defense of member 
countries’ armed forces have continuously coordinated, planned, and operated through 
multiple meetings. On November 4, 2017, the five chiefs of staff of the armed forces of 
Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Mali, and Mauritania (G5 Sahel) held a reflection meeting on 
the security situation in Ouagadougou.331 They signed an operating charter for a military 
cross-border cooperation partnership within the framework of bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation in the war on terrorism and cross-border crime.332 At the tactical level, in 
November 2017, the Force conducted its first tactical operation, named Hawbi, in the 
region of the three borders of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to show that the joint force 
had started its activities.333 The G5 Sahel stated that the operation aimed to fight armed 
groups and illicit traffickers and to control the region of the three borders in order to 
improve the security situation and to allow the peaceful return of population in their 
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villages.334 The ongoing capacity building of the G5 Sahel built strength from the 
agreement and cooperation at the political level.  
Although the force has not yet reached its full operational capabilities, its ongoing 
rapid rise has established good prospects for achieving regional security cooperation in the 
fight against transnational threats in the Sahel.  
  INITIATIVES BY THE UNITED STATES 
Along with regional attempts to combat transnational security challenges, the Sahel 
has seen external partners’ initiatives to foster security cooperation in the region. Since the 
dawn of the global war on terror, various external partners, mainly the United States, have 
pushed for stronger regional security cooperation in the Sahel. The country advocated for 
regional initiatives against transnational threats, mainly terrorism, through two main 
programs. The programs included the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), launched in 2002 with an 
$8 million budget to reinforce the military capacities of countries in the region, and the 
Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in 2005, representing the U.S. 
engagement in the Sahel that stems from the fight against terrorism in the early 2000s.335 
The two initiatives have reflected the concretization of the U.S. security advocacy in the 
region.  
1. U.S. PSI 
The new environment in the global war on terror shepherded the progressive U.S. 
commitment to increasing its presence in Africa. Combating global terror mainly drove the 
U.S. strategy in Africa.336 The 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy set policies of the 
Bush administration toward the Sahel during the early development of AQIM.337 This 
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strategy aimed to “help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build indigenous capability 
to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence 
infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists.”338 Alongside this point, the strategy 
emphasized that “forming coalitions of the willing and cooperative security arrangements 
are key to confronting these emerging transnational threats.”339 The strategy also singled 
out bilateral engagement through building coalitions as the security strategy focus.340 This 
policy has reflected a new beginning of U.S relations with Africa in the area of security.341 
This strategic vision explained the gradual and passive strengthening of U.S. engagement 
in the Sahel with the development of strategic military assistance partnership. 
The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) implemented the strategy of the war on 
terror in the Sahel and the Maghreb through the PSI. The PSI was essential to EUCOM’s 
responsibility in combating terrorism in the whole region of North Africa, West Africa, as 
well as in the Sahara deserts.342 Under the State Department’s funding, the PSI 
Counterterrorism initiative included Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger and aimed to fight 
transnational threats such as terrorism and illicit trade, and to enhance regional security 
cooperation through training that U.S. Special Forces from EUCOM provided to military 
units in beneficiary countries.343 In addition, the initiative evolved from training programs 
into an anti-terrorist campaign for tracking down suspected terrorists, as the threat of the 
Algerian radical Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC-Salafist Group 
for Preaching and Combat) grew and expanded progressively in the region,344 reflecting 
the military focus of U.S. policy.  
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This shift in strategy did not reduce security challenges, however. Rather the 
initiative sparked political debate in the United States. Conventional views in Washington 
perceived the PSI as “a conspicuous success in prohibiting the establishment of an Islamist 
safe haven in the Sahara.”345 Yet, the PSI failed to achieve its objectives.346 The expansion 
of violent extremist ideologies and their steady rise in the Sahel and the Maghreb since 
2002 raised many questions about the effectiveness of U.S. policy.347 This mixed 
perception has created doubt about the success of PSI and its future expansion. 
2. U.S. TSCTP  
Despite these different perceptions, in 2005, the Department of State replaced the 
PSI with the more broadly scoped TSCTP that expanded geographically including Algeria, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, and, afterwards, adding respectively Burkina Faso and 
Cameroon in 2009 and 2013.348 This new initiative entailed a more comprehensive regional 
stand. TSCTP, as an interagency effort, comprised the Department of Defense, Department 
of State, and USAID, and endeavored to enhance local government capacities in the Pan-
Sahel and confront security threats from terrorist groups in the trans-Sahara.349 This 
partnership focused on capacity building of security forces on counterterrorism through 
training and equipping.350 Targeting threats in deeply affected areas, the success of U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy against the growing AQIM growing threats was essential in the 
region remote and critical area.351 TSCTP carried greater ambitions than the PSI.  
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Like the PSI, the TSCTP came under fire for its failure to reduce transnational 
threats in the Sahel. Okolie and Kelechi, citing Burgess, note that the interagency 
collaborative efforts of the TSCTP in the global war on Islamist terrorism have not 
achieved their original envisioned objectives.352 Similarly, referring to Simon Tisdall, 
Okolie and Kelechi describe the U.S. regional initiative as unsuccessful and at times 
shambolic in fighting growing terrorist threat.353 Aloysius-Michael Okolie and Elijah 
Nnamani Kelechi further note criticism of the Government Accountability Office of the 
TSCTP regarding the government’s failure to build a comprehensive integrated approach 
and remarking on the limitations of the progress measurement toward the counterterrorism 
goals.354 Therefore, TSCTP’s reputation took a blow just as the PSI did. 
In sum, the two well-intended, U.S.-led initiatives failed as they neither built the 
expected military capacities of member states nor fostered regional security cooperation in 
the war on transnational threats in the region. The United States pursued passive foreign 
policies through military capacity building that did not involve any active role. As a result, 
despite U.S. initiatives, the world witnessed helplessly the rise of Islamic extremism 
together with smuggling, fueling internal secessionist movements. 
 CHALLENGES TO COOPERATION 
Regional security cooperation does not quite always work in the Sahel, resulting in 
the progressive deterioration of the Sahel’s security situation. Individual countries have 
proved unable to deal with transnational threats that have challenged their authority and 
the stability of their nations. Countries with divergent security interests have also 
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countenanced competition and rivalries, which, consequently, have led to the failure of 
attempts at regional security cooperation. Yet, the increasing involvement of international 
actors in dealing with transnational security challenges in the region has begun to influence 
the regional political environment in favor of a shared vision of threats and the promotion 
of collective solutions. Therefore, this evolution assumes that effective security 
cooperation is reachable, though it is still far from being achieved. 
1. Regional Rivalries  
The climate of rivalries between Algeria, Morocco, and Libya in the Maghreb—
origins of the threats that have scoured the Sahel—has negatively affected relations among 
countries in the region and hindered any attempts at cooperation. Rivalries between the 
three North African countries have always disrupted regional security cooperation, 
particularly the Algerian-Moroccan continuing tension.355 Similarly, the two countries’ 
rivalry “over the deadlocked Western Sahara conflict” has exacerbated tension as 
“Moroccan diplomatic influence in Mali and Mauritania” attempted to impede the initiative 
and success of an “effective regional security framework” that excludes Morocco.356 
Countries in the Sahel have traditionally suffered from the consequences of differing 
perceptions of Maghreb countries over the promotion of their geopolitical interests. These 
tensions have always undermined any attempt at regional cooperation.  
The situation deteriorates when rivalries arise between North Africa and the Sahel 
countries. For example, in 2010, tensions rose between Mali and Mauritania as well as Mali 
and Algeria regarding the perception that the Malian leadership hesitated to fight AQIM, 
to have alleged connections with transnational criminals, to free Western hostages in 
exchange for ransom payments, and to release convicted AQIM members.357 This turmoil 
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led to diplomatic tension. In 2010, Mauritania and Algeria protested by recalling their 
ambassadors from Mali.358 The Algerian-led initiative to create CEMOC and UFL suffered 
from these rivalries. While Libya reportedly rejected the offer to join, Algeria deliberately 
excluded Morocco.359 Therefore, the influence of the Maghreb countries has not 
contributed to foster regional cooperation.  
2. Regional Competition 
Competition over regional hegemony has also exacerbated rivalries and turmoil 
among key countries in the region. Libya and Algeria competed over leading mediation in 
the 2006 and 2007 Tuareg insurgencies, respectively, in northern Mali and Niger.360 
Wolfram Lacher notes that Libya’s connections to the “Tuareg rebel factions allowed the 
country to torpedo Algerian efforts” to grant peace between belligerent parties.361 Anouar 
Boukhars argues that Morocco, Algeria, Chad, and Nigeria have a central stake in West 
Africa and the Sahel geopolitics,362 as they these countries constitute the main regional 
security hegemons. In addition, countries’ pursuit of their geopolitical interests has 
worsened the climate of competition, and has limited their commitment to any attempt to 
cooperate beyond the Sahel and the Maghreb borders. At the height of the Malian crisis in 
2012, while ECOWAS members supported the French vision for a military intervention 
against the coalition of terrorist groups in the country, Algeria and Mauritania opposed 
such plans because ECOWAS intervention would push terrorists back to their countries of 
origin.363 Algeria as a regional key player because of its army strength, its alleged control 
over the terrorist groups, and strong influence on the destabilizing Tuareg rebel groups, has 
not also supported outside interference in a region that it has considered as its influence 
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zone.364 For example, Algeria considers Mali as part its strategic backyard and perceives 
negatively the French army deployment in the northern regions of the country.365 
Therefore, regional countries’ interests take precedence over interests of achieving regional 
security cooperation. 
3. Mutual Mistrust  
In addition to rivalries and competition, mutual mistrust among countries in the 
Sahel and the Maghreb remains a major constraint for achieving regional security 
cooperation. Mistrust has revolved around suspicious relations between states’ interests, 
terrorism, and smuggling. Some analysts describe Algerian intelligence services as 
“masters in the black arts of disinformation” with a probable connection to and 
manipulation of hostage-taking episodes in the Sahel.366 Jean-Herve Jezequel, the West 
Africa Deputy Project Director at the International Crisis Group, indicates that 
misunderstandings sometimes grew between regional countries as in the case of Mali and 
Mauritania and Niger and Mali.367 He praises some forms of confidence building in order 
to frame a common understanding of trust and consensus between countries.368 The various 
presumed connections between terrorism, transnational criminalities, and states’ interests 
have fueled the persistence and growth of the threats in the Sahel as Maghreb states, 
including Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya as well as foreign powers have promoted 
their strategic and operational interests in the region.369 Meghrebis who constituted the 
large percentage of the foreign fighters of Al Qaeda in Iraq helped in building the trust 
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connections between Maghreb-based groups and Al Qaeda central.370 This unhealthy 
environment is not likely to guarantee the necessary regional collaboration to overcome 
threats in the region. 
Mistrust has negatively constrained the achievement of regional security 
cooperation in the Sahel and Maghreb region. Laurence A Ammour argues the incapacity 
of neighboring countries to frame a consensual cooperation has fragmented their actions 
against AQIM increasing its influence in the region.371 He also remarks, “Algeria faces 
inverse incentives to combat AQIM outside of Algiers as it gains much of its geostrategic 
leverage by maintaining overstated perceptions of a serious terrorism threat.”372 As a result, 
Laurence A Ammour concludes, “the Algerian government’s limited legitimacy, primarily 
derived from its ability to deliver stability, constraints a more comprehensive regional 
strategy.”373 According to a 2016 report of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, the difference in levels of threat perceptions and mutual distrust have undermined 
the effectiveness of joint action.374 Therefore, suspicions around key security stakeholders’ 
connections with terrorism explain regional countries’ reluctance to adhere fully to any 
regional initiative. 
 CONCLUSION 
The failure and the success of the various initiatives have rested on the political 
willingness of the regional states and international support. The main factors that drove 
these attempts range from growth of transnational organized crimemainly AQIM and its 
affiliatesand advocacy by Western powers to promote regional cooperation. CEMOC 
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and UFL, as well as the U.S. PSI and TSCTP, failed as they lacked the ability to reduce the 
transnational threats while AMISOM and MNTF succeeded as they have seriously reduced 
Boko Haram’s influence and hindered its capacity to operate. Further, the G5 Sahel’s 
ongoing capacity building promises a successful future. Competition, rivalries, and 
mistrust, however, have created a cold relationship and environment among countries that 
constrain promotion of regional security cooperation. Reasons for failures and success of 
these initiatives include, respectively, predominance of countries’ interests and their 
willingness to cooperate, and the support of external partners. Therefore, this chapter shows 
that regional security cooperation is possible if the Sahel and Maghreb countries express 
strong political support and the international community supports that cooperation.  
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IV. DIFFERENT PATHS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION 
IN THE SAHEL  
This chapter analyzes the U.S., EU, and AU regional strategies for the Sahel in 
addressing transnational threats in the region. The chapter aims to contribute to framing a 
comprehensive, effective, suitable, and implementable model for regional security 
cooperation that can address transnational security challenges in the Sahel. The analysis 
determines how the concept of these strategies can test and validate my hypotheses in 
achieving effective regional security cooperation in the Sahel: the balance between 
security, development, and governance; the necessary inclusion of the Maghreb; and the 
shared perception of the threats with the expression of regional countries’ political will to 
cooperate and the support of the international community. Each strategy has strengths and 
weaknesses, suggesting none of them alone carries the right, exact, or absolute solution. 
Therefore, effective Sahel regional security cooperation results from combining common 
strengths among actors who understand regional threats and, thus, can address underlying 
drivers of insecurity and instability within the Sahel, as well as in the Maghreb countries, 
with the expected support of external partners.   
 U.S. STRATEGY FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
SAHEL 
The United States does not seem to have a comprehensive security cooperation 
strategy to address transnational threats in the Sahel. Despite official rhetoric of renewed 
interests in Africa, the United States continues to pursue a low-profile policy toward the 
continent, resulting in U.S. unpreparedness for events, including security challenges, 
political instability, and humanitarian challenges. J. Peter Pham argues that the “overall 
U.S. engagement in the Sahel remains minimal,” despite the U.S. State Department’s 
official statement naming the Sahel terrorist groups, including Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Al-
Mulathamun, Boko Haram, and Ansaru, as the greatest regional threats to U.S. interests.375 
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U.S. interests in the Sahel fall within the broader context of the U.S. interests in Africa, 
which are driven mainly by the military. The perspective meets the views of General Kip 
Ward, U.S. AFRICOM commander, perceiving the role of Department of Defense (DOD) 
in Africa “as part of the a ‘three-pronged’ U.S. government approach,” with the DOD 
carrying a leading role through U.S. AFRICOM on security backed the Department of State 
and USAID in a secondary role.376 Therefore, security implications challenge U.S. 
engagement in Africa.        
Historically, Africa has not been a U.S. priority, and the United States has tended 
to leave the continent to its EU partners. For example, U.S. policy makers have maintained 
the steadfast belief that “Africa is ‘a European responsibility.’”377 Peter J. Schraeder argues 
that, during the Cold War, the United States left complete responsibility to its European 
allies to lead their former African colonies.378 In 1968, Under-Secretary of State for the 
Kennedy Administration, George Ball, “succinctly summarized” U.S. recognition of 
“Africa as a ‘special European responsibility.’”379 In 1983, in addressing Chad’s growing 
crisis, President Ronald Reagan told President Francois Mitterrand that France held 
historical responsibility to intervene,380 ultimately downsizing the leading role of the 
United States. Recently, in 2011, during the civil war and political crisis in the Ivory Coast, 
President Barack Obama backed off and let France and the Europeans lead, acknowledging 
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the high leverage that France already had in the region.381 As a result, the U.S. low-priority 
policy in Africa is characterized by the prevalent use of military, suspicions surrounding 
regional countries’ commitment to U.S. sponsored initiatives, and neglect of threat drivers 
in the Maghreb countries. 
1. Predominance of Military Solutions 
The United States remains unprepared not only for emergencies but for overall 
growing security challenges in Africa and the Sahel. In April 1986, following Colonel 
Muammar Gaddafi’s links to “hiatus terrorist attacks,” combined U.S. Air and Navy forces 
bombed “five targets in Tripoli and Benghazi” to coerce Libya.382 “A relatively benign 
executive order of January 7, 1986” guided this “operational continuum” of the “try and 
see” policy as an “urgent classic ultimatum” of a coercive strategy.383 In 1992, following 
the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, the United States deployed one of the largest forces in 
Africa, Operation Restore Hope, comprised of 25,000 troops from 24 countries under the 
UN security mandate for restoration of security, provision of humanitarian needs, and 
support to civilian population.384 Unfortunately, the United States then lost 18 U.S. 
Rangers following a disastrous attempt to arrest General Mohamed Farrah Aideed and 
withdrew its troops.385 In 1998, in reaction to the terrorist bombing of the U.S. embassy in 
Nairobi and Kampala in East Africa, the United States retaliated by bombing a 
pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan.386 Thus, military action epitomized these 
reactions as the case of “‘try and see approach,’ another variant of coercive diplomacy … 
in which a demand is formulated without the explicit threat or time limit and involves a 
                                                 
381 Nick Amies, “Critics Accuse Obama of Inaction in Africa,” DeutschWeille, August 14, 2018, 
https://www.dw.com/en/critics-accuse-obama-of-inaction-in-africa/a-15194523.  
382Tim Zimmermann, “The American Bombing of Libya: A Success For Coercive Diplomacy?” 
Survival 29, no. 3 (1987): 206, https://iiss.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338708442356.  
383 Tim Zimmermann, “The American Bombing of Libya: A Success For Coercive Diplomacy?, ” 206, 
207.   
384 A. Sarjoh Bah and Kwesi Aning, “US Peace Operations Policy in Africa: From ACRI to 
AFRICOM,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 1 (2008): 131, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310701879969. 
385 Bah and Aning, “US Peace Operations Policy in Africa: From ACRI to AFRICOM,” 614, 615. 
386 Ploch, Africa Command: US Strategic interests and The Role of the US Military in Africa, 5. 
   
 
84 
gradual threat rather than step-level increase in pressure,” with the objective “to foster the 
flexibility of the coercive strategy.”387 The militarily-reactive posture and lack of 
consistence of the United States dealing with African issues explains the uncertainty of the 
country’s prevailing approach, shortfalls in readiness to commit a full engagement in 
Africa. 
In the decades of the global war on terror, continuous militarization of U.S. policy 
toward Africa in general and the Sahel in particular has increased through various 
administrations. The 2018 U.S. National Security Strategy, under President Donald Trump, 
indicates military and security as priority actions toward Africa with the objective to work 
continuously with partners in improving capacities of their security services to deal with 
terrorist threats and the whole spectrum of illicit trafficking including human, arms, drugs, 
and natural resources.388 The strategy also emphasizes this partnership in the defeat of 
terrorist groups and their affiliates threatening U.S. interests.389 Nearly 20 years after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, the military and security remain central in U.S. relations with Africa.  
The military presence also increased under President Barack Obama; however, he 
also created the Security Governance Initiative (SGI). The 2010 U.S. National Security 
Strategy mentioned various security hotspots on the African continent in general, including 
civil wars in Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central 
African Republic.390 The strategy particularly mentioned the Sahel as home to violent 
extremism that threatened civilians, regional countries, and U.S. national security and was 
spreading across the whole region in Somalia and Nigeria.391 In response, President Barack 
Obama pledged an SGI, deepening security partnerships with African countries and 
institutions in order to address conflicts and transnational threats and to build African 
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peacekeeping capacity under strong recommendation of respect of human rights and the 
rule of law.392 Despite a slight move toward governance, military presence continued to 
increase.  
During his terms, President George W. Bush established U.S. AFRICOM, 
essentially heightening U.S. military presence in Africa. The 2001 U.S. National Security 
Strategy emphasized security in its International Strategy, which asserted:  
Our Nation’s cause has always been larger than our Nation’s defense. We 
fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We 
will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will 
preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And 
we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every 
continent.393  
The prevalence of the military characterized the Bush administration in promoting U.S. 
interests in the world.   
Despite the political differences among these three administrations, ultimately, U.S. 
political strategy continues to use military force. Specifically, President George W. Bush 
created AFRICOM, representing the U.S. military institution, with its first mission 
statement directing the Command mission “to promote U.S. strategic objectives” through 
building partnership, security capability, and military professionalization of African 
countries in order to strengthen regional stability and security.394 In 2007, the Bush 
administration increased military aid significantly through the creation of AFRICOM, 
signaling the enhancement of its strategic interests.395 President Barack Obama worked 
toward state-building in creating the SGI while his administration also increased military 
presence, and, so far, President Donald Trump like President George W. Bush has 
increased military presence. Analysis of these U.S. strategies reflects their military focused, 
which has resulted in an imbalance in security, governance, and development.  
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Several activities illustrate the militarization of U.S. policy in promoting its 
strategic interests in Africa in general and the Sahel in particular. Baz Lecocq and Paul 
Schrijver argue that, within the concept of Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. Army 
opened two fronts in Africa, “one in the Horn of Africa, the other in the Sahara–Sahel,”396 
with the objective “to train quick reaction forces in each of the four countries.”397 Citing 
Sigrid Faath, Lecocq and Schrijver state that the latter front started with Pan Sahel Initiative 
including Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad, then, later, the Trans-Saharan Counter-
Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, and Nigeria, in 
addition to the original Sahel countries, aiming to create counterterrorist units with 
temporary operation support bases for U.S. forces in each country.398 In 2014, the United 
States spent $100 million to build “a temporary base for surveillance drones in Agadez, 
central Niger … to help West African countries in combating terrorist groups and control 
their borders.”399 These moves exemplify the military focus of the U.S. strategy in the 
Sahel. 
One of the reasons for the imbalance in security, development, and governance of 
U.S. policy is the reluctance of U.S. leadership to fully acknowledge other options. As 
Marcel Plichta argues, U.S. policy makers misperceive the Sahel as outside the umbrella 
of counterterrorism, and even the most moderate non-security perspectives, including that 
of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, remain entrenched in the narrow and militaristic view 
of the conflict.400 U.S. Africa Commander, General Thomas D. Waldhauser, during his 
March 2018 testimony before Congress, affirmed that the use of military force has little to 
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achieve in dealing with various challenges in Africa and stressed the need for significant 
reforms beyond the military including pragmatic political and economic development in 
the Sahel.401 Potential alternatives that are less dependent on military might exist in 
boosting U.S. policies for the Sahel. 
2. Suspicions about U.S. Commitment to Regional Security Cooperation  
Following suspicions about the motivation for the U.S.-led war in Iraq in 2002, 
African countries in general and the Sahel in particular remained cautious toward the 
growing U.S. engagement on the continent. For example, African key stakeholder countries 
reacted negatively to U.S. attempts to locate the headquarters of AFRICOM on the 
continent.402 South Africa and Algeria, U.S. strategic partners, have been reluctant to host 
the command because of potential interference in their sovereignty,403 raising dormant 
distrust. Some conspiracy theorists believe that the U.S. attempt might hide the pursuit of 
an alleged secret U.S. military agenda on the continent.404 The U.S. African partners have 
perceived the shift of U.S. new strategic orientation as too militaristic and reacted with 
much reserve. 
The conditions for granting U.S. military assistance worsened this perception of 
mistrust. The most controversial fact is that the grant of U.S. military assistance is based 
on “U.S. political, economic, and energy interests rather than government transparency, 
democracy, and human rights performance.”405 In such an environment, regional countries 
might mistakenly undermine U.S.-led initiatives presumed to promote partnership. As a 
result, these initiatives might likely encounter unofficial willingness to cooperate from 
countries in the region. Therefore, most regional countries’ perception of U.S. policies is 
not inclined to boost regional countries’ full commitment, which is indispensable to 
achieve regional security cooperation.    
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3. Drivers of Threats in the Maghreb   
Similarly, U.S. policy toward the Maghreb, a key player in the Sahel security 
threats, carries the same security focus, neglecting the root causes of insecurity and 
instability. Marina Ottaway remarks that security concerns drive U.S. policy regarding the 
Maghreb countries, neglecting recent political transformations, and acknowledges the 
restoration of political stability as a grant for succeeding in counterterrorism efforts.406 
Despite the reality of U.S. concerns about increasing security threats in the Maghreb and 
Sahel, engagement in the fundamental political transformation of the Maghreb countries 
should be supported because only successful political and economic transitions can provide 
the long-term stable framework for tackling security issues.407 The 2008 TSCTP, the most 
notable U.S. regional security initiative that covered the Maghreb and the Sahel, has not 
produced significant achievements,408 neither fostering regional security cooperation nor 
reducing transnational threats. Therefore, the implementation of U.S. military-focused 
policies have not gained regional countries’ interests as being indispensable in addressing 
the Sahel transnational threats through regional security cooperation.   
Because of its emphasis on military measures, reluctance of leadership, and trust 
issues, the United States has only been able to achieve a limited influence on regional 
countries’ desire to cooperate. Jeremy Keenan argues that U.S. militarization policy has 
disrupted the hitherto relative tranquil Sahara‐Sahel region, brought more “insecurity, 
repression, economic and social disruption, political instability,” and is far from achieving 
development and security, as AFRICOM claims.409 Similarly, Catherine Besteman 
indicates that, although official claims support AFRICOM’s capacity “to enhance security 
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through military capacity-building, humanitarian projects, and development,” the fact is 
that AFRICOM’s military orientation destructively tends to define security in solely 
military terms, preventing real progress.410 The implementation of U.S. policies for the 
Sahel has not contributed in boosting regional countries’ desire to cooperate, thus raising 
inherent hurdles.  
Ultimately, U.S. military-focused policies have not addressed the root causes of 
insecurity and instability in the Sahel. Donald C. Bolduc sees the U.S. government’s 
approach regarding regional insecurity and instability as inadequate, despite the fact that 
policy makers and senior leaders in the military and State Department have acknowledged 
for decades the growth of extremist groups, criminal networks, and illicit trafficking 
nexus.411 Bolduc also argues that the United States has failed to frame a “comprehensive 
African strategy” that addresses violent extremism and governance issues and creates an 
environment favorable for socioeconomic development.412 Kwesi Aning, Thomas Jaye, 
and Samuel Atuobi argue that U.S. strategic interests have led to highly and increasingly 
militaristic and state-centric engagements in Africa that differ fundamentally from human 
security for development as African security concerns.413 In sum, with military-focused 
policies that cause countries in the region to only cautiously commit, U.S. engagement has 
so far struggled to catalyze regional consensus in addressing the Sahel transnational threats 
and their underlying factors through regional security cooperation.    
 EU STRATEGY FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL 
As opposed to the U.S. approach, the EU security strategy for the Sahel falls within 
the framework of a strong interaction of previously referenced security, development, and 
governance through broader regional security cooperation that includes the Maghreb. On 
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March 21, 2011, the EU Foreign Affairs Council adopted the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) Sahel strategy draft as a major policy initiative.414 EU reports from fact-
finding missions in Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Algeria in 2009 and 2010, as well as the 
multiple kidnapping of European hostages by AQIM, have triggered European 
engagement.415 EU leadership expressed strong political will toward an engaged strategy, 
understanding the importance of the Sahel as an inescapable part of the broader European 
neighborhood and that the protection of European prosperity and security depends on 
establishing a ring of well-governed neighboring countries.416 This strategy of engagement 
drives consensus among European countries.  
The EU strategy framework includes security to address regional threats as well as 
governance and development to address underlying drivers of insecurity and instability, 
and most importantly, the framework includes the Maghreb as part of a broader Sahel 
security concern driven by a strong political willingness. Four key themes summarize this 
comprehensive approach: 
Firstly, that security and development in the Sahel cannot be separated, and 
that helping these countries achieve security is integral to enabling their 
economies to grow and poverty to be reduced. Secondly, that achieving 
security and development in the Sahel is only possible through closer 
regional cooperation. This is currently weaker than it needs to be, and the 
EU has a potential role to play in supporting it. Thirdly, all the states of the 
region will benefit from considerable capacity building, both in areas of 
core government activity, including the provision of security and 
development cooperation. Fourthly, that the EU therefore has an important 
role to play both in encouraging economic development for the people of 
the Sahel and helping them achieve a more secure environment in which it 
can take place, and in which the interests of EU citizens are also 
protected.417  
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This summary of the strategy includes highlights of security issues in the Sahel and 
Maghreb.  
 The EU strategy takes into account the indispensable link between security, 
development, and governance in the region. The strategy, in its larger regional context, 
focuses on Mali, Mauritania, and Niger as the primarily affected nations and is articulated 
around a large spectrum of additional plans including “development, good governance, 
internal conflict resolution, political and diplomatic aspects, security and rule of law, and 
violent extremism and radicalization.”418 In addition, medium- and long-term objectives 
include a five-to-ten-year perspective to set “conditions for local and national sustainable 
development” for prosperity in the Sahel region that undermines the influence of 
transnational threats.419 The three-year perspective aims to improve access of populations 
to “basic services” such as “roads, livelihoods, education, and social services,” and 
consequently reduce the potential for armed groups, terrorists, and criminal groups’ 
recruitments.420 Therefore, the EU strategy targets the underlying factors that feed 
insecurity and instability in the region.  
 Furthermore, the EU’s allocation of substantial funding to the strategy for the Sahel 
demonstrates the expression of the political will. As shown in Table 1, this funding includes 
the Sahel as well as the Maghreb as part of its broader strategy, with €606,250 million and 
€193 million, respectively.421 For example, the EU, the biggest donor, supports the G5 
Sahel’s initiative through three main tracks including political partnership, development 
assistance, and security support.422 The political partnership includes regular high-level 
EU-G5 dialogues with the purpose “to strengthen regional cooperation” on common shared 
interests such as counterterrorism, security, youth employment, migration, sustainable 
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development, and humanitarian aid.423 For development assistance, the European Union 
has committed €8 billion over 2014–2020 to support regional development efforts, and the 
EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability has committed €843 million so far for preventing 
“irregular migration and displacement of populations in Africa.”424 The European Union 
is also a strong advocate for the newly established regional “Alliance for the Sahel,” created 
“to coordinate existing EU and Member States development assistance better in the region, 
in a faster and more interlinked way than before through joint action.”425 The EU’s funding 
commitment for the implementation of its strategy shows its willingness for regional 
security and stability.    
Lastly, the European Union supports the G5 Sahel Joint Force—concrete regional-
led security initiatives—with an initial €50 million for the establishment of the force, 
aiming to counter terrorist groups through improving regional security cooperation.426 
Additional measures include the civilian missions EUCAP Sahel-Niger and EUCAP Sahel-
Mali, as well as the military training mission in Mali (EUTM) as part of the three relevant 
EU missions of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) security to improve 
regional capacity building of law enforcement and rule of law.427 These different initiatives 
show the full expression of political will of EU members’ support in boosting regional 
security cooperation.  
As Table 1 shows, the European Union allocates substantial funding both to the 
core Sahel countries and those of the Maghreb in the implementation of the strategy for the 
Sahel. 
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Table 1. EU assistance to the Sahel and Maghreb428 
 
 
The EU-SAHEL regional action plan (RAP) 2015–2020, which establishes the 
framework of the 2011 EU strategy for the Sahel, is a tangible holistic approach advocating 
for a focused regional response on major security priorities for the coming five years.429 
Regarding the implementation of the plan, adopted on April 20, 2015, the European Union 
stressed close regional and international coordination including the UN, AU, ECOWAS, 
the G5 Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and the World Bank as well as civil 
society through the full direction and primary responsibility of the affected countries.430 
Based on the Sahel’s proximity to the European Union and its immediate neighbors, the 
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strategy stresses “a common space for dialogue and cooperation between the Sahel, the 
Maghreb, and the European Union” in tackling cross-border matters such as security and 
migration.431 This five-year plan represents an important step in the implementation of the 
EU strategy. 
This strategy seemingly meets the Algerian professor Aomar Baghzour’s proposal 
to create a new framework for cooperation in the Western Mediterranean—including the 
North of Africa, the countries of the South of Europe and the Sahel countries—as part of 
the new regional geopolitics excluding the necessity of U.S. oversight.432 He also advises 
to build this new regional security dynamic on current concrete cooperation initiatives, by 
either resuming or promoting them, with the ultimate and desirable goal of the Maghreb-
Europe-Sahel bloc to bring security, stability, and prosperity to this extended region.433 In 
sum, with availability of funding, countries’ strong political will, and support of the 
international community, the EU Strategy for the Sahel, in its broader geopolitical 
perspective, is a viable tool that addresses transnational threats and their underlying factors 
through regional security cooperation.    
 THE AFRICAN UNION STRATEGY FOR SECURITY AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL 
Like the EU, the AU strategy for the Sahel carries a comprehensive approach that 
addresses the Sahel security threats through a strong advocacy for regional security 
cooperation among regional countries as well as a call for international support. The 
strategy falls within the framework of the AU Agenda 2063 on governance, security, and 
development issues constituted by Constitutive Act and the general AU strategy.434 Drafted 
and adopted in 2014, the strategy came as a result of lessons learned from the 2011 Libyan 
crisis with greater concerns in anticipating and engaging the potential regional spread of 
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the crisis.435 The strategy is articulated around the African Union Mission for Mali and the 
Sahel (MISAHEL), which is the AU structure responsible “for the effective 
implementation of this strategy” and to collaborate closely, take necessary action, and 
coordinate with other AU institutions within the Sahel and beyond.436 Therefore, the 
inclusiveness of the collective effort remains central in the implementation of the strategy.  
The AU strategy also builds on existing institutions working to strengthen regional 
security cooperation. Following the Libyan crisis in 2011, the AU coordinated and 
intensified actions with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa 
(CISSA) and the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT).437 AU 
security cooperation priority in the Sahel also includes promotion and deepening regional 
security cooperation through the March 2013 Nouakchott Process, a periodic meeting of 
the heads of intelligence services and competent ministers of the Sahel region.438 The main 
objective of the process aims to improve regional security cooperation, share information, 
and operationalize the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the Sahel-
Saharan region.439 The support to the disarmament, demobilization, and socio-economic 
reintegration (DDR) process in Northern Mali and the security sector reform (SSR) 
programs in the Sahel region with partners’ cooperation are part of the priorities.440 The 
implementation of the strategy carries a comprehensive approach that involves other AU 
organizations. 
The strategy highlights governance, development, and the inclusion of the Maghreb 
as factors that improve security and stability in the Sahel and potentially drive regional 
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countries to cooperate. The introduction of the strategy clearly states governance, security, 
and development as its three central pillars with the advantage of the AU’s oversight 
mandate, experience, and familiarity with the Sahel issues.441 For the implementation of 
its strategy for the Sahel, the African Union has advocated for regional countries’ 
collaboration and cooperation, as well as the support from various Regional Economic 
Communities, mainly ECOWAS, and international partners.442 This strategy is articulated, 
in terms of governance, around priority areas that include consolidating rule of law, 
democracy, decentralization, and “sharing of successful experiences,” as well as promoting 
“human rights and humanitarian actions.”443 The strategy also addresses anti-corruption, 
resources management, and the electoral process as well as the involvement of religious 
and traditional leaders in the process of building peace and national cohesion with the 
participation of nomadic communities, and the management of conflict.444 Each of these 
priorities promotes regional dialogue in addressing transnational challenges trough 
regional cooperation.  
Relating to development, the AU strategy praises regional cooperation through the 
program of Civic Service for Development Action (SCAD) that offer civilian, civic, and 
professional training to young volunteers and AU policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
and Development (PCRD) as initiatives in assisting in the Sahel countries’ development 
projects.445 Priority areas for regional cooperation include supporting collaboration 
between regional countries on “infrastructural and development projects, socio-economic 
integration of youth and women,” regional “agricultural and pastoral development, and 
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support” to populations’ resilience.446 The strategy emphasizes regional mechanisms in 
addressing internal insecurity and instability drivers as well as cross-border challenges.  
In addition, the strategy wisely frames the regional dimension of the threats in 
addressing the security challenges. The AU strategy engages the Sahel on an inclusive 
geographical approach, including the core Sahel as well as the Maghreb countries, and on 
a geostrategic approach to countries outside the Sahel, particularly Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, and Senegal.447 As a collaborative effort, the implementation of 
the strategy also includes important AU and non-AU structures, programs, or regional 
countries within and beyond the Sahel as well as assistance and collaboration of the 
Regional Economic Communities (REC), other regional mechanisms in the Sahel, and 
African financial institutions.448 These institutions involve ECOWAS, the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
(CEN-SAD), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the Interstate Committee for 
Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS).449 The inclusivity of the strategy translates its 
regional cooperation perspective.    
Lastly, the appearance of individual countries’ commitment seems to pave a 
promising way for regional cooperation dynamics in the Sahel and the Maghreb. 
Conditions for success include the continuous expression of Sahel countries’ political will 
for cooperation and other partners, the prioritization of regional, continental, and 
multilateral assistance over bilateral cooperation, the strengthening of confidence 
measures, the continuous consultations at all levels between regional stakeholders, and the 
availability of financial resources necessary for the implementation of the strategy.450 
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Therefore, the AU strategy makes sense in terms of attempts and good intentions for 
institutions and coordination in addressing transnational security challenges because it 
centers on regional cooperation and is expressed with inclusive rhetoric.  
Nevertheless, the reliance of the African Union on external partners to support its 
strategy for the Sahel may portend a failure ahead. The African Union itself is under 
financial pressure and depends largely on foreign financial aid. For example, the 
implementation of the AU Pan African Program costs the European Union €6.5 million.451 
China funded and built the AU $200 million headquarters in Addis Ababa, positioning 
Ethiopia “a symbol of Beijing’s thrust for influence in Africa, and access to the continent’s 
natural resources.”452 For perspective, in 2012, AU member states contributed to only three 
percent of the annual programmed budget.453 In such conditions of relying on external 
support, which is not always guaranteed, the success of the strategy for the Sahel remains 
more rhetorical than realistic, as the African Union lacks the resources to implement its 
policy.  
 CONCLUSION  
Among the U.S., EU, and AU strategies for the Sahel, no major difference exists in 
their main objectives to achieve security and stability through regional cooperation. First, 
all parties share an awareness of the gravity of the deteriorating security situation as well 
as the necessity to act in a collaborative way. Even if the United States tends to focus on 
military approaches, its support remains invaluable as all parties recognize that cooperation 
is indispensable in addressing the threats and their underlying factors. The previous 
initiatives have paved the road forward to regional security cooperation. Countries in the 
region and beyond hailed the initial major mobilization as an important leap in overcoming 
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regional challenges and in reaching regional security cooperation. However, with some 
countries’ fragile openness to regional security cooperation, distrust toward key 
stakeholder countries taints the regional environment. Thus, a pessimistic argument can be 
made about regional countries’ ability to manage their gains in addressing transitional 
threats through regional security cooperation. Key stakeholder countries still prioritize 
their own national interests over regional security.  
Second, political differences complicate the achievement of regional security 
cooperation. Regional countries cooperate either on security as a priority or development 
and governance previously discussed as the main pillars. It is obvious that regional 
countries share different interests and are not at the same level of development. While some 
countries are interested in focusing on security, others might tend toward economic 
cooperation. In the scheme of a broader regional security cooperation that includes the 
Maghreb, as the European Union envisions and the African Union more extensively toward 
West African coastal countries, the core Sahel countries that are deeply affected by 
transnational threats prioritize security and others might be more interested in economic 
development. These differences still prevail in the Sahel political environment.   
Third, the limitations of predominant military responses have shown that a broader 
model beyond military and security is necessary to boost the security cooperation effort. 
The struggles of the previous U.S. attempts at regional security cooperation, as well as the 
Algerian-led initiatives, prove this point. The current criticism of the militarized U.S. 
policy in the Sahel represents additional evidence. This reliance means undermining 
potential drivers of threats. It also generates suspicion around a possible hidden agenda of 
external powers. Most regional countries are reticent to embrace a foreign military presence 
or activities on their territory; they perceive it more as a challenge to their sovereignty and 
accept it reluctantly as the very last resort. Therefore, a less militarized strategy that 
incorporates development and governance reduces countries’ suspicions and is more likely 
to encourage and foster regional cooperation.       
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
We are engaged in an issue that is beyond us, so the whole world must be 
in solidarity. It is not a question of tending the bowl, it is not about begging; 
it is simply a solidarity effort well understood in the interest of the whole 
world. Not Africa, not sub-region Sahel, not Mali,but the whole world... It 
is also to say that today we are carrying a project that is in a way a dike with 
regard to terrorism. If the dike gives way, the whole world will be washed 
away. So it’s as simple as that.454 
 
—Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, President of Mali and G5 Sahel 
A regional approach is required to solve a regional problem. The Maghreb is mostly 
the origin of the threats that pervade the Sahel region. With the current regional and 
international efforts to stabilize the Sahel, the hope is that regional countries and, 
particularly the Maghreb countries, will express a continuously strong commitment to 
regional security cooperation. Hence, this openness will facilitate positive collaboration 
within the Sahel and Maghreb countries and then between the Sahel and the Maghreb 
regions in order to drive a regional consensus and build an effective regional security 
cooperation.  
A positive collaboration among countries requires statesmanship and dialogue. The 
Sahel needs active multilateral diplomacy defined by Kishore Mahbubani as a means to 
solve transnational problems through diplomatic solutions with the engagement of more 
than one country.455 As multilateral diplomacy contributes to problem solving and 
promotion of international cooperation that is shifting rapidly  at the regional level, as in 
the case of the EU’s economic success,456 arguments can be made for the potential use and 
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expectation of multilateral diplomacy to achieve regional security cooperation in the Sahel 
and Maghreb. In this case, regional security cooperation in the Sahel could become the 
foundation of a transition toward, for example, economic prosperity that will further 
motivate regional countries’ interests. This chapter gives lessons learned and 
recommendations for achieving effective regional security cooperation.  
 FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED  
Analysis of previous attempts at regional security cooperation in the Sahel and U.S, 
EU, and AU strategies for the Sahel has highlighted important lessons learned for achieving 
effective security cooperation in the Sahel. These organizations all share grave concerns 
regarding the increasing transnational security challenges that constitute threats to national, 
regional, and global security. The Sahel region remains a geographical space with great 
regional and global security concerns. Terrorism, illicit trafficking, and secessionist 
movements threaten national, regional, and global security. An analysis of the evolution of 
the threats has established that geography and history are important factors that contribute 
to the growing regional insecurity and instability. While geographical factors favor 
interaction between the Sahel and the Maghreb and safe havens for non-state actors, the 
history of permanent conflicts has complicated any alliance of willingness. The continental 
and international mobilization in support of the Sahel countries reflects the essential 
definition of these strategies. This section gives the major findings of this research in 
addressing insecurity and instability in the Sahel.   
1. Adequate Balance between Security, Development, and Governance  
Military solutions currently dominate regional security cooperation in addressing 
insecurity and instability in the Sahel. Andrew Lebovich argues that, despite an emphasis 
on the need for improving governance, security-focused policies remain the center of 
gravity in region-wide strategies.457 Jennifer G. Cooke and Boris Toucas qualify the rapid 
expansion of international security forces in addressing the 2013 crisis in Mali as a 
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“Regional Security Traffic Jam,” which has proved to be inefficient, as terrorist groups 
have demonstrated nimbleness and resiliency.458 Cooke and Toucas remark that 
governments in the region have prioritized military force and ignore tackling drivers of 
militancy in marginalized communities.459 The narrowly focused military response of these 
regional security initiatives achieves neither the elimination of security threats nor 
countries’ cooperation. 
Involved countries and external partners have come to understand that the 
predominance of a sole and focused military solution does not guarantee the full 
commitment of countries in collectively addressing transnational security challenges in the 
region. Military solutions might still be far from improving the situation even if threats are 
defeated. Other root causes of militancy, which countries face in the Sahel, involve 
governance and development. According to the June 2017 UNODC progress report on the 
Sahel program, security, good governance, and development have been vilified for the 
benefit of the evil flourishing of illicit trafficking in drugs, humans, and weapons though 
traditional routes,460 proving the indispensable link among these three factors. 
Consequently, the success in achieving any effective regional security cooperation in the 
Sahel requires a comprehensive approach that goes beyond purely a military one and must 
encompass security, development, and governance in order to gain regional countries’ 
interest as well as the international community’s support.  
2. Importance of the Maghreb  
Any regional security cooperation strategy in the Sahel that excludes the Maghreb 
is likely to flounder because the two regions are so interlinked in term of security threats. 
Cristina Barrios and Tobias Koepf remark that none of the numerous regional cooperation 
                                                 
458 Jennifer G. Cooke and Boris Toucas, “Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, 
Building Regional Security?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 15, 2017, 
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fora in the Sahel-Sahara region “combines a comprehensive geographical scopeby 
including the Maghreb states in their frameworkand a focus on security cooperation.”461 
Analysts recognize the separation between the Sahel and the Maghreb, acknowledging 
nonetheless the necessity of regional responses to these transnational threats, and that the 
Sahel-Sahara security equation requires the active involvement of the Maghreb states 
regarding their interrelation and interdependence.462 Anouar Boukhars argues the current 
origin of insecurity and instability in the Maghreb countries is the growing social and 
economic marginalization.463 Abdelhak Bassou recognizes the strong security and stability 
interdependence between the Maghreb, the Sahel regions.464 He then argues that there is 
interference between the two neighboring regions, but that security of the former depends 
on security of the latter.465 He concludes the Sahel countries play an important role in the 
success of security strategies in the Mediterranean basin, which includes the Maghreb and 
the European Union.466 The Maghreb and Sahel fit in the same security complex as a result 
of growing transnational threats. 
The security threats in the Sahel link back to the Maghreb countries. For example, 
Alexis Arieff argues, “Algeria is a major source of transnational terrorism.”467 The U.S. 
Government Trafficking in Persons Report ranks Algeria on the Tier 2 Watch List for 
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human trafficking as the country that lacks will to prevent the practice, punish the crime, 
and protect the victims.468 According to the 2016 EU Drug Markets Report, Morocco 
cannabis resin land-channels cross Mauritania and Algeria through the Sahel, the Middle 
East, and Asia.469 This situation describes how security threats are born in the Maghreb 
countries, transcend their borders, and grow in the Sahel countries, much like the familiar 
African saying: “you would rather blame your contact point than your collapse site.” 
Maghreb security threats affect the Sahel, and any regional security strategy that addresses 
the root causes of Maghreb threats is likely to gain regional countries’ commitment.  
3. Shared Perception of Threats  
Third, the effectiveness of any regional security cooperation in the Sahel requires 
regional countries to play down their geostrategic interests and to share a unified perception 
of threats. For example, while Mauritanian authorities signed a renewal “truce” that 
includes the release of all AQIM prisoners and payment of an annual $11 million to $22 
million in exchange of the terrorist groups’ promise to spare the country from its attacks,470 
Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso reeled under attacks from the same terrorist groups. 
Governments in the region must understand that regional transnational threats represent 
existential threats to their nations that share the same security concerns as the security of 
my neighbor is also mine.  
Countries’ shared perception of threats is indispensable to achieve effective 
regional security cooperation in the Sahel. Speaking at the U.N. Security Council’s 8024th 
meeting on August 20, 2017, El-Ghassim Wane, Assistant-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations declared that the success of the Joint Force in the Sahel depends 
on the commitment of the G5 Sahel countries to create the force with the strong support of 
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their international partners.471 Therefore, countries should demonstrate voluntarist 
appropriation of strategies at regional security cooperation.  
 RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of greater global attention drawn to the Sahel recently, this research 
recommends: 
• To ensure a continuous commitment of regional countries in achieving 
regional security cooperation, we need multilateral diplomacy or 
diplomatic pressure from external partners and the international 
community on reluctant countries to reshape those countries’ perspective. 
There is room for regional security cooperation as long as countries fear 
being sidelined for lack of commitment by the international community.  
• Regional security cooperation between the Sahel and the Maghreb remains 
the sole path to address transitional security challenges. As discussed in 
Chapter II, geography and history interlink the Sahel and the Maghreb, 
and the origin of the Sahel threats tracks back to the Maghreb; therefore, 
the Maghreb must be included in building effective regional security 
cooperation.   
• The support of the international community, coupled with guarantee of 
available external funding, remains indispensable to ensure the success of 
any regional cooperation. The Sahel countries rank among the poorest 
countries in the world and lack economic and financial capacity to address 
these challenges. So, without external support, these countries will 
continue to falter as a logical consequence of the deteriorating security 
situation and permanent lack of regional security cooperation.         
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• The delicate balance among security, development, and governance must 
be ensured regionally, both in the Sahel and the Maghreb, as discussed in 
Chapter IV, and make sure they formed a solution-oriented mandates in 
addressing the threats and their underlying factors.  
• Regional security cooperation must further trend toward regional 
economic integration with the baseline for more prosperity and 
opportunity that will undermine offers from criminals and armed groups to 
recruit terrorists.       
 CONCLUSION  
Ultimately, effective regional security cooperation in the Sahel represents a chimera 
for those who share pessimistic views about African security issues. Most of the Sahel 
countries are failing states, making them fertile breeding grounds for terrorists, illicit 
traffickers, and secessionist groups. Yet, the differences among these countries’ perception 
of the threats and their own interests constrain regional security cooperation. This 
skepticism means regional security cooperation in the Sahel and more broadly in the 
Maghreb is essentially stillborn.  
In addition, some countries in the Sahel and the Maghreb mistakenly think that they 
can preserve themselves and have peace by redirecting threats to neighboring territories, 
undermining regional cooperation. Some external powers also, rather than pursuing their 
own interests, could have avoided contributing to the chaos in Libya following the 2011 
NATO intervention that worsened an already fragile regional security and fueled more 
suspicions among regional countries. For the Sahel, world powers must be more attentive 
in fostering regional security cooperation through various ways as part of their contribution 
in sharing the burden of their deeds. The international community’s full commitment is 
required to ensure a strong cooperation between the Sahel and the Maghreb, which is 
indispensable to guarantee security in the Sahel, because the disastrous security situation 
raises worldwide concerns.  
In the words of the current Malian president, it is a crucial matter of global interest 
that the Sahel survives and thrives. Therefore, the Sahel countries, with their neighboring 
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Maghreb countries and extensively their European partners, as well as the international 
community, all have an interest in forging regional security cooperation and achieving 
regional security and stability.     
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